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RECENT ACQUISITION REFORM THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 






Research conducted for this joint applied project attempted to determine which 
policies should be put in place to further acquisition reform, based on a review of 
previous reforms enacted through technology and workforce improvements and their 
consequent outcomes. The objectives of the project were to examine the various 
acquisition reform initiatives that have been enacted recently, in order to determine what 
reforms have proven successful in producing the intended outcome, and what reforms 
have not been effective in changing the acquisition process to accomplish the initial goal. 
We found that the various reforms instituted over the previous twenty-five years have 
attempted to address how acquisitions can be streamlined within the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to create efficiencies and improve cost and schedule for major programs. 
The major finding of this research is that there is overlap in the reforms that have been 
initiated and the changes they seek to implement. This makes it difficult to determine 
what reforms are driving successes and failures of acquisition reform policy and which 
will allow policy makers to adjust and drive positive change to the DOD acquisition 
process based upon verifiable data collection. This lack of data can only be fixed by 
resetting the acquisition reform process.  
It is our recommendation that a fifteen-year suspension be placed on acquisition 
reforms to stabilize the system and reset the data collection. Once stabilization has 
occurred, a new acquisition reform should be enacted, and a second suspension of fifteen 
years should be implemented to ensure data can be collected and the reform can be 
analyzed in isolation. This strategy would ensure that the data collected solely represents 
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This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) acquisition reform initiatives implemented from 1990 to the present in 
order to provide an understanding of changes in the acquisition workforce and the 
increase in automated reporting systems that have been a part of recent acquisition reform 
initiatives. This historical background information will serve as a foundation for the 
present state of acquisition processes and lay the groundwork for further investigation 
into what future reforms remain necessary. The importance of this research will be 
documented for the reader in this chapter, along with the methodology utilized to conduct 
the research. A problem statement will outline a clear and immediate need facing the 
defense acquisition community from which defined research questions and objectives 
will be presented for resolution throughout this thesis project. 
 A. BACKGROUND 
Complications stemming from supporting various major conflicts in the Middle 
East beginning with the Gulf War in 1991, in conjunction with two separate budget crises 
during the late 1990s and late 2000s, contributed to the need for acquisition reform. The 
following information identifies and describes the themes of major acquisition reforms 
implemented by law or policy changes within the DOD since 1990. This is useful to 
understanding the larger picture of acquisition reform before focusing on workforce 
changes and automated reporting requirements as it relates to the DOD acquisition reform 
and improvements in the Defense acquisition process.  
1. Acquisition Reform in the 1990s 
Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has listed acquisition 
reform in the DOD on its list of high risk issues, particularly for major weapons system 
acquisitions. There have been multiple attempts at comprehensive acquisition reform 
throughout the history of defense acquisition with varying degrees of success and failure. 
The push for acquisition reform in the 1990s was guided by the philosophy put forth by 
the Packard Commission Report issued in 1986; the central and guiding theme being to 
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transform the procurement process to be more “responsive, effective, and efficient” 
(Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, and Steele, 2005, p. xiv). The principle taken from 
the report and reiterated with each new push for reform was to overhaul the process to 
obtain systems “faster, better, cheaper” (Hanks et al., 2005, p. xiv).  
Out of the reforms proposed in the Packard Commission Report, the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 was born (Eide & Allen, 
2012). This reform generated the establishment of a formalized process to legitimize the 
acquisition workforce within the Defense Department through professional training 
culminating in the achievement of a certification that validates that they meet set 
standards of education, training, and experience required for their specific field within the 
acquisition community (Eide & Allen, 2012).  
In 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted in an 
effort to improve performance and management internally throughout the Government 
requiring agencies to establish goals, measure their success in terms of achieving those 
goals, and report their progress to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (GAO, 
2009). From this reform measure, agencies began developing strategic plans, 
performance plans, and reporting on progress toward the accomplishment of those 
planned goals to provide Congress with greater insight into problem areas (GAO, 2009).  
Another landmark legislation that affected the DOD acquisition procedures 
followed with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. This law 
expanded upon the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 with the introduction 
of simplified acquisition procedures, regulations increasing small business participation, 
and further promotion of the use of fixed-price performance-based contracting while 
integrating the use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products wherever possible 
(Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 1994). The law also lifted the regulatory Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold for submission of cost or pricing data (Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act, 1994).  
In an attempt to further streamline the acquisition process, the Federal Acquisition 
Reform Act (FARA), later renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, granted contracting 
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officers greater latitude when making competitive range determinations as well as raising 
the dollar threshold enabling the use of Simplified Acquisition Procedures for 
commercial item acquisitions up to $5 million (H.R. 1670, 104th Congress, 1996). 
2. Acquisition Reform in the New Millennium 
With the arrival of the new millennium, new initiatives were introduced to further 
revamp the acquisition process in hopes of reducing costs, condensing timelines to 
contract award, increasing quality of products, and eliminating roadblocks to efficient 
contracting. In 2003, the Service Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) was passed and 
accomplished a variety of changes. Among them, committing funds for training of 
acquisition professionals, incentivizing the use of performance-based contracting for 
services, authorizing the use of Time and Materials type contracts for the procurement of 
services, providing expedited procurement authority for acquisitions in support of 
contingency operations, and consolidating the acquisition workforce across the military 
branches into a single acquisition corps (Services Acquisition Reform Act, 2003).  
The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 was the next 
major reform initiative and this law attempted to reduce total ownership cost and cycle 
time for development of weapon systems by preempting operational issues through 
focused decision making early in the design phase and through early testing and 
evaluation. WSARA instituted Directors for Test and Evaluation, Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation, and Systems Engineering to produce policies, provide guidance, and 
monitor the activities in their respective areas (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act, 2009). The law further required the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E) periodically assess the technological maturity of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAP) and annually report those findings to Congress, placed an emphasis 
on producing prototypes of MDAPs whenever practical, and shifted the trend of giving 
control of system design away from contractors by requiring that combatant commanders 
exert more influence in the requirements generation process (Weapons Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act, 2009). The law also tightened restrictions related to conflicts of 
interest by Industry contractors and mandated increased competition for the purpose of 
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reducing acquisition costs (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009). 
Subsequently, the DOD Instruction 5000.2, which directs the process for acquiring 
systems, was updated to outline a mandatory requirement for exercising competitive 
prototyping for major weapons systems, ensure systems engineering and technical 
reviews are performed, and require all programs to undergo a Material Development 
Decision (MDD) process, which validated that concrete requirements are in place prior to 
obtaining approval authority to commence the system acquisition (Schwartz, 2014).  
3. Acquisition Reform from 2010 to the Present 
In 2010, Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative 1.0 was released with the primary 
theme being to “restore affordability and productivity in defense spending,” an attempt to 
improve the way the DOD conducts business to gain more efficient outcomes (Carter, 
2010, p. 1). The objectives set forth in the memorandum were to “deliver the warfighting 
capability we need for the dollars we have, get better buying power for [the] warfighter 
and taxpayer, restore affordability to defense goods and services, improve defense 
industry productivity, remove government impediments to leanness, avoid program 
turbulence, and maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry” (Carter, 
2010, p. 4). One of the tools the initiative introduced was providing incentives to industry 
in the form of awarding the right type of contract for the work being performed (Carter, 
2010). The reform promotes the workforce to “phase out award-fee contracts and favor 
fixed-price or cost-type incentive contracts in which Government and industry share 
equally in overruns and underruns” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). Additional incentives included an 
effort to “align the opportunity to earn profit/fee to both value to the taxpayer and the risk 
to the contractor” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). The initiative further advocates “rewarding 
excellent suppliers” and “involving dynamic small businesses in defense” contracting 
(Carter, 2010, p. 5). To improve Government practices, the initiative advocated using 
“historically informed independent cost estimation (‘will-cost’ estimates) to inform 
managing of programs to cost objectives (‘should-cost’ estimates),” improving the 
quality and consistency of Government audits, eliminating redundancy in procuring 
multiple systems fulfilling similar objectives, and stabilizing production rates (Carter, 
2010, p. 6).  
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In November 2012, Better Buying Power 2.0 was released with the intent of 
“continuing the pursuit for greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending” 
(Kendall, 2012, p. 1). Better Buying Power 2.0 promised to “institute a system to 
measure the cost performance of programs and institutions and to assess the effectiveness 
of acquisition policies [by the Department becoming] more data-driven in assessing its 
own and industry’s performance at achieving improved productivity” (Kendall, 2012, p. 
2). The memorandum asserted that the Department would develop metrics to better assess 
the performance of the acquisition process. The initiative further emphasized the 
importance of building stronger relationships with the requirements development 
community, embarking on early planning and enforcement of open system architectures, 
and effectively managing technical data rights all geared toward achieving the goal of 
cost control (Kendall, 2012).  
In March 2015, Better Buying Power 3.0 was released building upon the 
incremental approach of the previous Better Buying Power initiatives with a “shift in 
emphasis toward achieving dominant capabilities through innovation and technical 
excellence” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 1). The initiative promotes streamlining documentation 
requirements and staff reviews which detract from program execution and consume 
resources, such as time and money (Kendall, 2015a). It further encourages the fostering 
of relationships among the acquisitions, requirements, and intelligence communities in an 
effort to ensure their programs will build dominant capabilities (Kendall, 2015a). This 
iteration of Better Buying Power illuminates the need for the acquisition community to be 
forward thinking and adaptable in the planning of our systems currently in development 
with the intent to anticipate the enemy’s response to these systems and plan accordingly 
(Kendall, 2014a). This need arises as the nation’s “adversaries are modernizing at a 
significant rate, and they are responding rapidly to our development programs and fielded 
systems” (Kendall, 2014b, p. 4).  
The three Better Buying Power initiatives focus on an incremental approach to 
acquisition reform within the DOD and are a result of budgetary constraints from 
Congress on the Department, which were further escalated through sequestration. Also in 
March 2015, the House Defense Committee Chair, Representative Mac Thornberry (R-
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TX), proposed a new round of acquisition reforms for the DOD that takes the same 
incremental, long-view approach of the three BBP initiatives and builds upon those 
reforms. The reforms aim to reduce the administrative and reporting burdens and increase 
the effectiveness of the DOD managers to make decisions (Bennett, 2015).  
4. Synopsis of the History of Acquisition Reform 
In each of the various acquisition reforms that have been initiated within the 
DOD, the DOD has sought the best way to procure cutting edge technologies without the 
schedule slippage, cost growth, and technical performance issues that are customarily 
associated with these types of procurements. These acquisition reforms include the DOD-
initiated reforms, such as the Better Buying Power initiatives, or reforms directed through 
Congressional action, such as DAWIA and SARA. In spite of the numerous attempts to 
overhaul the DOD acquisition process, systemic issues persist within the acquisition 
process. Reform remains a necessity as Congress has routinely approved approximately 
$400B for defense spending to procure technologies to support the country’s defense; 
however, economic contractions have caused the push for reform to resurface with new 
momentum in an effort to utilize funds more efficiently than they have been in the past. 
Reform is necessary to ensure quality technologies are available to the DOD 
expeditiously, and at a fair and reasonable price.   
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem facing the acquisition community is that the acquisition process has 
been reformed multiple times over the past decades and the process is still in need of 
reform as the initial goal of fashioning a process that procures cutting edge technology at 
a fair and reasonable price, in a timely manner, and with the desired quality and 
functionality has not yet been attained. 
After innumerable attempts to restructure and reform the acquisition process, 
procurements of major systems and emerging technologies continue to extend far past 
their planned procurement date, far exceed the original costs allocated for the project, and 
continue to have operational problems that cost more money and time to rectify (GAO, 
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2015). At the same time, accountability is necessary to ensure money is allocated 
properly, systems are delivered timely, and the proper precautions are taken to ensure 
systems are built to clearly defined and achievable specifications for optimal 
functionality and interoperability in the field. Acquisition reform over the past twenty-
five years has not succeeded in delivering the efficiency, cost savings, and accountability 
required to bring in DOD acquisitions in on schedule, within budget, and with the desired 
quality as evidenced by the fact that the GAO continues to name acquisition reform for 
major weapons systems on its list of high risk issues for past two and a half decades.  
Acquisition reform must consider the balance between efficiency in acquisition 
and the necessary visibility and tracking of the process to verify that the goal of efficient 
acquisition is being or has been met. Instead of increasing the speed of the acquisition 
process, the increased use of technology to perform oversight may increase the burden on 
the lower-level workforce. A balance is necessary to allow technology to benefit the 
workforce in performing their jobs while increasing the ability of higher-level 
headquarters to have program visibility through current reporting of accurate information.  
The DOD workforce appears to be affected by multiple reforms resulting in 
increased reporting requirements, increased use of automated reporting systems, 
increased certification and training requirements, changing demographics, including an 
aging workforce, reductions-in-force (RIF), hiring freezes, etc. It is imperative to 
determine if the workforce is adequately considered during the drafting of acquisition 
reforms, and if any increased stressors on the workforce negatively impact their ability to 
effectively and efficiently implement meaningful acquisition reform.  
The objective of this research is to address the problem of ineffective reform of 
the DOD acquisition process over the past twenty-five year period from 1990 to current, 
focusing on prior reforms and the impacts to the DOD workforce, the various reporting 
requirements, and the resultant automated reporting tools. This will allow us to determine 
what reforms have proven more successful in producing the intended outcome and what 
reforms have not been as effective in changing the acquisition process to accomplish the 
initial goal. Upon determining these gaps in the reform process and the reasons for 
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previous reform’s successes and failures, the result of this research will be to propose a 
path forward for the DOD acquisition reform through additional workforce improvements 
and relooking the reporting requirements of past reforms. 
1.  Thesis Statement 
A coherent and effective approach to reforming the DOD acquisition process 
through workforce and reporting improvements is needed based upon an analysis of 
previous and recent acquisition reform during an age of technological advancements and 
workforce changes.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to examine the various acquisition 
reform initiatives related to acquisition workforce improvements and reporting 
requirements that are recent and relevant to determine what reforms have proven 
successful in producing the intended outcome and what reforms have not been effective 
in changing the acquisition process to accomplish the initial goal. Upon determining the 
gaps in the reform process and the reasons for previous reform successes and failures, the 
result of this research will be to propose a path forward for DOD acquisition reform 
through a coherent approach of additional DOD workforce improvements and revised 
automated reporting requirements.  
The secondary objective of this research will be to analyze the impact of the 
reforms on the acquisition workforce as an indicator of the success and failure of 
reaching the intended results for the proposed acquisition reform initiatives that seem to 
have failed and investigate whether additional, potentially unintended consequences 
resulting from the reforms have contributed to impeding real acquisition reforms. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are posed in this thesis research to allow our 
analysis to develop a proposed path towards comprehensive acquisition reform utilizing 
workforce improvements and automated reporting tools to fill the gap left by previous 
acquisition reform efforts. These questions support the research objectives outlined in the 
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previous paragraph.  Conclusions based on the answers to these questions will be utilized 
in proposing a path forward for future reform. 
(i) Primary Research Question 
Primary Research Question 1:  What acquisition workforce reform initiatives have 
proven successful in reducing cost, schedule, and improving system quality control and 
why? 
(ii) Secondary Research Question 
Secondary Research Question:  What measures have been put in place to 
determine success or failure regarding the impact of the reform initiatives on the 
acquisition process? 
E. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to examine a problem that has persisted in 
Government acquisition and to find a solution to reform the DOD acquisition process that 
will produce positive results in condensing timelines to award, bringing procurements 
through development, production, and delivery within schedule and on budget, and 
acquiring quality systems that meet the needs of the warfighter. The concern of several 
Presidents and Congressional bodies has been the genesis of countless studies, proposals, 
and resultant legislation attempting to overhaul the DOD acquisition process to achieve 
efficient purchasing ability on behalf of the Government. The DOD’s inability to acquire 
systems at a fair and reasonable price in a reasonable time allotted by the initial contract 
has been an item on the high risk list of issues for the GAO for the past twenty-five years. 
Finding a practical solution to this problem is a high priority for the nation’s leaders and 
taxpayers, who entrust the Government to effectively steward their tax money. 
F. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY 
This project will conduct a scholarly review of the DOD acquisition reform over 
the previous twenty-five years, focusing on acquisition workforce reform initiatives 
contained within those reforms, in an effort to examine which policies have accomplished 
their objectives and which have not. The review will also consider changes in the 
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acquisition environment which might have influenced the effectiveness of the 
implemented reforms. An analysis will be conducted of the various initiatives to 
determine which have proven successful and which have not. Resources for conducting 
this research will include the DOD reform policy documents, GAO reports, scholarly 
publications, local DOD Contracting Office pilot studies and reports, and various online 
sources. 
G. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This report contains four chapters. Chapter I, Introduction and Background, 
provides the reader with the thesis and a description of the problem, along with an 
understanding of why the thesis is important, what will be investigated, and how the 
research will be conducted. General information will be provided as background 
information for the reader to provide a basic understanding of the importance of proper 
and effective DOD acquisition reform through workforce improvements. The information 
provides the reader with a basic understanding of the subject matter of the thesis.  
Chapter II provides the reader with the research data gathered to investigate the 
thesis. This information will provide further information for the authors to use as part of 
the analysis. It will provide the research results for the DOD acquisition process as a 
whole, investigating existing DOD acquisition reform initiatives over the past twenty-five 
years, with a focus on workforce improvements and reporting requirements, detailing 
workforce changes in the DOD over the past twenty-five years, and describing 
incorporation of automated systems for reporting in the DOD over the past twenty-five 
years.  
Chapter III provides an analysis of the information provided in Chapter II. 
Chapter IV provides the conclusions and recommendations for future DOD acquisition 
reform related to workforce improvements, reporting requirements and the resultant 
increased use of automated reporting systems.  
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H. SUMMARY 
Within this chapter, a basic understanding of the scope of the DOD acquisition 
reform during the past twenty-five years has been provided. A problem statement and 
resulting research questions have been identified. The methodology of the research has 
been documented. A thesis statement has been delivered. The following chapter will 








The previous chapter provided the reader with an overview of the DOD 
acquisition reform initiatives as a basis to present the current state of acquisition 
processes. Chapter II will provide the reader with information from research conducted 
by the authors on various topics related to acquisition reform and the effect of those 
reforms on reporting requirements and workforce improvements undertaken in the 
previous twenty-five year period. This research information will provide a basis for the 
analysis of these facts in determining a path forward for DOD acquisition reform.  
A. COMPLEXITY OF THE DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The complexity and rigidity of the DOD acquisition process is responsible for 
discouraging various businesses, both small and large, from participating in DOD 
acquisitions. This is a major problem when seeking innovative solutions for DOD 
requirements, especially as the Department seeks solutions for more complex and 
changing adversaries (Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense, 
2012). This section will provide a discussion of the complexity of the DOD acquisition 
process and describe the rules governing the DOD acquisition process, including the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its supplements, as well as the DOD 
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02.  
Figure 1 is a complex roadmap of the requirements placed on the DOD Program 
Managers (PMs) as a program flows through the acquisition life cycle from inception to 
sustainment. Mr. Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), stated that the increased regulations since the 
mid-1980s “places an extraordinary and unnecessarily complex burden on program 
managers and staffs” (Garamone, 2013, p. 1). As is visible in Figure 1, the complexity of 
both the number of moving parts and the required interactions with multiple fields of 
expertise within the acquisition career field make the management of DOD programs 




Figure 1.  Phases of the DOD Acquisition Life Cycle. Source: Defense 
Acquisition University. 
Because of the cumbersome nature of the acquisition process, the House Panel on 
Armed Services concluded in its research on the DOD acquisition process that there are a 
“number of hurdles [that] make it challenging for companies to compete for defense 
contracts. The acquisition process is often bureaucratic and rigid, with insufficient 
flexibility” (Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense, 2012, p. vii).  
1. Rules Governing the DOD Acquisition Process 
The same House Panel on Armed Services report “found that constantly changing 
regulations leads to unnecessary complexity, confusion, and poor execution, only 
furthering challenges for the acquisition workforce” (Challenges to Doing Business with 
the Department of Defense, 2012, p. vi). These regulations governing the DOD 
acquisition process fall under two categories, the FAR and its agency-specific 
supplements, and the DoDI 5000.02 guidelines for PMs. 
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a. Federal Acquisition Regulation and Supplements 
The FAR came into existence in 1984 and is the set of regulations that guide the 
acquisition of supplies and services by federal agencies in the Executive Branch of the 
government that are using appropriated funds from Congress. The intent of the FAR is to 
reduce and eliminate redundancy within Agency-specific acquisition regulations and to 
provide consistency within the Federal acquisition system (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, 2015).  
The FAR consists of fifty-three parts and over 32,000 pages of acquisition 
regulations, provisions, and clauses. The fifty-three parts are contained within eight 
subchapters are detailed in Table 1.  
Table 1.   FAR Subchapters and Parts. Adapted from Barne (2015). 
Subchapter and Title Parts A: General Parts 1–4 B: Competition and Acquisition Planning Parts 5–12 C: Contracting Methods and Contracting Types Parts 13–18 D: Socioeconomic Programs Parts 19–26 E: General Contracting Requirements Parts 27–33 F: Special Categories of Contracting Parts 34–41 G: Contract Management Parts 43–51 H: Clauses and Forms Parts 52–53 
 
 
The United States Small Business Administration (SBA) website refers to the 
FAR as “a substantial and complex set of rules governing the federal government’s 
purchasing process” in their description of the regulations to potential small businesses 
interested in competing for government requirements. 
Acquisition professionals within the DOD must adhere to the regulations 
contained within the FAR. Additionally, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) is a more restrictive set of guidelines that the DOD acquisition 
professionals must adhere to. Each Service within the DOD has their own Service-
specific supplement that is more restrictive than the DFARS. For instance, the Army has 
the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) (Schwartz, 2014). 
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Additional command-specific regulations are included above and beyond the FAR 
and its supplements. For example, the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) provides 
Contracting Officers with an ACC Deskbook providing additional guidance and 
regulations above and beyond the FAR and its supplements that Contracting Officers 
must consider during the contracting piece of the acquisition process. ACC Contracting 
Centers, such as the ACC Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), have additional Deskbook 
regulations that must be followed by Contracting Officers.  
A division-level Contracting Officer in the Army is responsible to adhere to 
regulations contained in the FAR, DFARS, AFARS, ACC Deskbook, and ACC-APG 
Deskbook during the performance of their duties. Contracting Officers are also 
responsible to digest, interpret, and advise program offices on the regulations contained 
within the FAR, its supplements, and the Command Deskbook guidance. Division-level 
Contracting Officers in ACC are responsible for being knowledgeable in the contents of 
five sets of regulations.  
b. DoDI 5000.02 Guidelines for Program Managers 
The original DoDI 5000.1 was issued in 1971 by then-Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Packard (Cochrane, 2009). It was an eight page document that required three 
major decision points and only required one supporting document. The DoDI 5000.02 is 
the fifteenth revision to the acquisition process in thirty-four years. Over the history of 
the DOD 5000 acquisition guidelines, the number of pages has ranged from eight in 1971 
to 840 in 1991. More recently, in 2008, it contained a directive and instruction that 
totaled ninety pages (Cochrane, 2009). The current 2015 DoDI 5000.02 version is an 
instruction totaling 154 pages (Department of Defense, 2015). DoDI 5000.02 
incorporated reforms aimed at decreasing cost and schedule slippage. For instance, the 
first cost estimate required to be submitted was in support of Milestone B. As part of 
DoDI 5000.02, a cost estimate is required for the proposed solution during Milestone A 
as part of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) (Fast, 2010).  
The DoDI 5000.2 is referred to as focusing on the “little a” in the Defense 
acquisition process (Schwartz, 2014). It includes the Pre-Systems Acquisition, Systems 
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Acquisition, and Sustainment. As part of those three phases, there are three program 
milestone decision points that drive the program office in determining whether or not to 
proceed with the development of a requirement. Figure 2 is an overview of the defense 
acquisition milestones as part of the acquisition process (Schwartz, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Defense Acquisition Milestones. Source: Schwartz (2014) 
The three acquisition milestone decision points act as safeguards for the program 
to ensure that all statutory and regulatory requirements have been met prior to proceeding 
to the next phase of the acquisition process (Schwartz, 2014). Approval to proceed 
beyond Milestone A leads into the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase of 
the acquisition process. Once this phase is complete, approval is required at the Milestone 
B phase of the acquisition process. If approval is granted, the program proceeds to 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development, where Developmental Testing and 
Operational Testing are conducted. After this phase, Milestone C is the last of the three 
Milestones requiring approval. If Milestone C is approved, the program is authorized to 
enter into Production, Deployment, and Sustainment (Schwartz, 2014). 
Sources indicate that the DoDI 5000.02 “establishes a simplified and flexible 
management framework for translating mission needs and technological opportunities 
into stable, affordable, and well managed acquisition programs,” which appears to be the 
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case in the simplified process outlined in Figure 2 above (Brown, 2010, p. 17). However, 
the complexity and documentation requirements for each phase and milestone decision 
point can be seen in Figure 1.  
For instance, a review of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Defense 
Acquisition Portal (DAP) tool indicates that for an Acquisition Category I Component 
(ACAT IC) or ACAT I Defense (ID) program, which is considered a MDAP, thirty-one 
statutory documents are required to be completed in support of the milestone acquisition 
decision points, including major decision points and major supporting documentation 
required before reaching the milestone decision point1 (Milestone Document 
Identification (MDID, 2015). Of those thirty-one documents required, many are required 
at least twice and some as many as five times. Overall, eighty-eight statutory documents 
are required to be completed to facilitate a program from user need to Milestone C and 
cannot be waived unless allowed by the statute. Additionally, thirty-six regulatory 
documents are required to be completed. Of those thirty-six reports, most are required at 
multiple DoDI 5000.02 life-cycle events, with some required as many as six different 
times in the process. Overall, 116 regulatory documents are required to be completed to 
facilitate a program from user need to Milestone C. Regulatory document requirements 
can be waived based upon sound business judgment of the risks of the program. It is 
unknown the frequency that these documents are waived. A total of 204 documents 
supporting the DoDI 5000.02 acquisition process may be required for an ACAT IC or ID 
program. For comparison, an ACAT III or lower program requires fifteen statutory 
documents submitted a total of 41 times and 34 regulatory documents submitted a total of 
112 times throughout the DoDI 5000.02 acquisition process. This equates to 153 
documents required to support a much less complex acquisition compared to an ACAT 
IC or ID program. The ACAT III or lower program requires only fifty-one less document 
submissions than a more complex ACAT I program would (Milestone Document 
Identification (MDID), 2015). While the intent of the DoDI 5000.02 is to provide a 
                                                 
1 These include Material Development Decision; Milestone A Decision Review; Capability 
Development Document Validation; the Development Request for Proposals Release; Milestone B 
Decision Review; Milestone C Decision Review; and Full Rate Production/Full Deployment Decision. 
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simplified framework for DOD acquisitions, there is a large amount of redundant 
documentation required to support the DoDI 5000.02 acquisition process.  
With the release of the updated DoDI 5000.02 acquisition procedures, the 
framework remained the same; however, “two new decision points” were added, a 
“requirements decision point and a development request for proposal decision point”  
(Garamone, 2013, p. 1). The new procedures add additional decision points to the process 
for acquisition professionals to support.  
DoDI 5000.02 incorporated reforms aimed at decreasing cost and schedule 
slippage, such as the above example where the first cost estimate was previously required 
to be submitted in support of Milestone B. As part of DoDI 5000.02, a cost estimate is 
now required for the proposed solution during Milestone A as part of the AoA.  
2. Recent Example of Successful Major Weapons Systems Acquisitions 
The standard that acquisition programs are judged on is coming in at or below 
cost and schedule parameters of the program. The WSARA of 2009, which will be 
investigated further in this report, was enacted by Congress to address major programs 
that exceed cost and schedule for the programs. Reforms in the DoDI 5000.02, which was 
recently enacted, are also aimed at addressing cost and schedule slippage in DOD 
acquisition programs (Fast, 2010). This is due to the fact that success for a Defense 
program office is based upon fielding “a system that is delivered on time, within cost, and 
meeting the warfighter’s requirements” (Brown, 2010, p. 14). Following is an overview 
of the acquisition of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) during war-time to 
meet urgent requirements, which is viewed as a successful recent DOD acquisition.  
a. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle 
The MRAP is a family of troop carrier in different variations based upon 
commercial prototypes with a V-shaped hull that is effective at deflecting blasts from 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that were causing major casualties during the Iraqi 
and Afghanistan conflicts. It is often referred to as an example of a successful defense 
acquisition to meet a warfighter requirement. Approximately 21,000 MRAPs were 
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manufactured and delivered between 2005 and 2009 utilizing a rapid acquisition 
approach. The need arose as a result of the inadequacy of the High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in providing blast protection to the 
warfighter, which failed to protect troops against IEDs (ARCIC Requirements Integration 
Directorate, 2013). Ramp-up of production increased from eighty-two vehicles delivered 
in June 2007 to 1,300 delivered in December 2007, which is an impressive increase in 
only six months (Miller, 2010). The MRAP acquisition program is typically used as a 
case study of potential acquisition reforms to increase speed and accuracy of 
requirements while coming in on schedule. It demonstrates what is possible with the 
“DOD use of a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field” (GAO, 2009, p. 
2). The success of the MRAP on the battlefield has been difficult to quantify. However, 
reports of a 30 percent decrease in casualties from 2000 to 2010 has been attributed to the 
MRAP, while the Pentagon’s MRAP program office estimates that 10,000 lives have 
been saved in Iraq and 30,000 in Afghanistan for a combined 40,000 lives saved as a 
result of the MRAP vehicle (Rogers, 2012). 
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan is the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
at the GAO. He provided testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 
Defense Acquisition Reform Panel in 2009. The purpose of his testimony was to advise 
on potential lessons learned from the MRAP acquisition that could be used in other 
defense acquisitions to improve and streamline the acquisition process. Overall, Mr. 
Sullivan indicated he believed that the MRAP program should be considered a success. 
The program’s success was due to the following 6 factors:  
1) then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ quick decision to provide a DX-
rating to the MRAP program, which prioritized the manufacturing of the 
MRAP vehicles over all other contracts that the manufacturer may be 
producing;  
2) availability of supplemental funding from Congress to pay for the 
requirement; 
3) market research that showed proven, commercial capabilities were available 
and the decision to solicit for previously developed vehicles; 
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4) “minimal operational requirements” of what was necessary to meet the user’s 
need; 
5) utilization of competition within contracting to drive innovation and pricing; 
and 
6) final integration of communication and military-specific equipment was made 
the responsibility of the government and not the contractor (GAO, 2009, p. 2). 
Immediately, Mr. Sullivan dismisses the first two factors as unreasonable to be 
transferred to other acquisitions because of the unlikelihood of it occurring. A DX-rating 
is not common and supplemental funding from Congress cannot be counted upon to 
allow for the stable funding of the requirements. However, he did indicate similarities 
between the remaining four factors that have been consistently reported by GAO as 
acquisition best practices. This includes the use of mature technologies, minimal and 
“well-understood” requirements, use of competition to incentivize contractors, and 
increased defense support of integration (GAO, 2009, p. 2). 
Mr. Sullivan’s beliefs are similar to other contemporary thought on the MRAP 
success that can be utilized in other acquisition reforms. The importance of the “minimal 
operational requirements” is similar to the 80 percent solution, which requires a tradeoff 
of risk of not getting everything the user community needs, often referred to as 
requirements creep. This tradeoff can lead to a faster schedule and an increased 
likelihood for success. It also requires flexibility in finding the additional twenty percent 
after production as improvements are identified (Garcia, 2009). There was a need for 
post-production and fielding fixes due to issues with the MRAPs’ reliability, mobility, 
and safety. However, by remaining flexible, the program office was able to quickly 
address the issues (GAO, 2009). The tradeoff for speed was reduced testing before 
fielding, which led to these issues, however, the risk was known when the program’s 
schedule was developed.  
Mr. Sullivan’s comments about final integration being the responsibility of the 
government has garnered traction as well. By the government being responsible for the 
final integration, it relieved the contractors of additional requirements and let them focus 
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on the sourcing of materials and production of the vehicles instead of the integration of 
the military-specific equipment on the vehicles (Garcia, 2009).  
A final area that Mr. Sullivan did not discuss, but may have had a positive impact 
on decreasing the MRAP’s schedule is the amount of documentation required to support 
an acquisition. As part of the MRAP program, then-Secretary of Defense Gates 
authorized the development of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), which was 
instituted to speed up the review and approval process. This helped “to streamline 
processes and reduce cycle time, which will lead to improved response time, lower costs, 
and more rapid fielding of critical technologies” (Garcia, 2009, p. 1). Secretary Gates 
established an MRAP Task Force with the mission of getting “as many MRAPs as 
possible and prudent” fielded within the year. Mr. Gates did this because he wanted to 
“bypass the normal Pentagon acquisition bureaucracy, which Gates viewed as too slow to 
react to urgent war requirements” (Miller, 2010, p. 18). It is unlikely that this approach 
could be utilized on most acquisitions since it is the “Pentagon acquisition bureaucracy” 
that is limiting the speed and response time that Gates’ was trying to circumvent, which is 
impossible to remove without significant acquisition reforms (Miller, 2010, p. 18). 
B. DOD ACQUISITION REFORM DURING THE PREVIOUS TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS 
The push for acquisition reform in the 1990s was guided by the philosophy put 
forth by the Packard Commission Report issued in 1986, which sought to shape the 
procurement process to be more “responsive, effective, and efficient” (Hanks et al. 2005, 
p. xiv). Comprehensive acquisition reform for major weapons systems in the DOD, such 
as those enabling the rapid acquisition of the MRAP, has been attempted over the past 
twenty-five years to get the right balance of affordable cost, expeditious delivery, and 
quality technology that meet the user needs.  
1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
In the 1980s, a series of scandals arose exposing multiple incidents within the 
acquisition community of exorbitant amounts of money being paid for commonplace 
spare parts. These scandals gained high profile status and gave rise to intense pressures 
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on the Executive and Legislative branches of the government to review the acquisition 
process and enact reform to prevent future incidents of government waste. The reviews 
concluded that the defense acquisition community was too large, unqualified, and 
ineffectual to perform its function. Specifically, the President’s Packard Commission 
Report recommended the institution of the DAWIA of 1990 which attempted to correct 
these issues by implementing regulations requiring the DOD to train the workforce to 
standards, track the size of the acquisition workforce, and institute the Acquisition Corps.  
These standards were issued in DOD Manual 5000.52-M, Career 
Development Program for Acquisition Personnel—a companion document 
to the DOD Directive 5000.52 that implemented the [DOD’s] training and 
education program published in 1991. The manual and its implementing 
directive were to be the sole regulatory authority for mandatory DOD 
acquisition training. While certification in at least one career field was 
required, individuals could be certified in other fields as well. The 
5000.52M specified the education, training, and experience standards for 
each career field, expanded the number of career fields prescribed in 
DAWIA, and grouped them into seven functional areas. This integrated all 
the elements of a previously fragmented, scattered, and diffused training 
system. (Layton, 2007, p. 18).  
Following the passage of the DAWIA, additional policies were issued in the form 
of DoDIs 5000.55 and 5000.66, which specified the “workforce reporting requirements,” 
established twelve career fields within the acquisition workforce to be tracked and 
trained, and provided instructions for the “selection, placement, and career development” 
of acquisition professionals within the defined career fields (Birkler, Arena, Blickstein, 
Drezner, Gates, Huang, Murphy, Nemfakos, and Woodward, 2010, p.116). To facilitate 
the requirements detailed in DoDI 5000.55, procedures were put in place to facilitate 
reporting and tracking data. Specifically, training reports in formats as specified in the 
instructions were to be submitted on “IBM 3480 compatible tape cartridges,” “magnetic 
tapes,” or “diskettes” that were “MS-DOS compatible” (Department of Defense, 1991, 
p.27). Reports compiled were to detail the name and identification number of each 
professional, their specific acquisition career field and level of certification; training 
courses taken and scheduled with the training completion dates; branch of service and 
organization; grade and length of employment, Acquisition Corps and/or Contracting 
Officer qualifications, and warrant type and limit, if applicable (Department of Defense, 
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1991). These reports were to be submitted from the individual agencies up to the 
Director, Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (OUSD(A)), who then was required to compile 
an annual report on the certification and training status of the acquisition workforce 
(Department of Defense, 1991). For classified programs or agencies, an annual 
certification of compliance with the instruction was submitted (Department of Defense, 
1991).  
As a result of these new requirements, management in the OUSD(A) were given 
the additional responsibility of ensuring the individual agencies followed the directive for 
submission of the tracking data; that the Directors of Acquisition Career Management 
(DACM) documented “all personnel and position qualifications;” that the “Chairs of the 
Acquisition Career Program Board” of the individual agencies documented all personnel 
qualification actions, and that the president of the DAU provided the necessary 
acquisition training courses and course graduation reports quarterly (Department of 
Defense, 1991, p. 5). New positions were instituted for the “Director, Acquisition 
Education, Training, and Career Development to monitor and report the [training] status 
of the acquisition workforce” and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) was 
charged to “serve as custodian of all automated records collected under [the] instruction 
and provide data quality control, inquiry capabilities, and administrative and computer 
support” (Department of Defense, 1991, p. 5). DoDI 5000.66 was issued to provide 
guidance on manpower management and charged the USD(AT&L) with managing the 
acquisition workforce, recommending funding levels to provide for the workforce, 
overseeing the AT&L Workforce Senior Steering Board (SSB), designating a Functional 
Advisor for each career field, and appointing a Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) 
to designate Key Leadership Positions (KLP) in the workforce (Department of Defense, 
2005). The individual CAEs with approval of their agency heads were to designate 
AT&L positions, specify Critical Acquisition Positions (CAP), submit approval for the 
KLPs at the USD(AT&L) level, approve applications of KLPs to the Acquisition Corps, 
and ensure their personnel receive training (Department of Defense, 2005). As a 
consequence of these initiatives, every member of the acquisition workforce was 
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impacted with additional workload to comply with the requirements and then to report 
and/or track the compliance with the requirements. In order to execute the directives, 
course curriculums were commissioned to be developed to certify the various career 
tracks within the acquisition workforce. In order to develop these curriculums, members 
of these fields from each of the DOD services chosen from a circle of qualified schools 
had to participate in providing their expertise to produce a line of courses that could 
present the fundamentals of their competency. The curriculums were entrusted to the 
DAU to educate the workforce which became operational in 1992. 
2. Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) 
Following implementation of DAWIA, Congress enacted the Government 
Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. Within the legislation, Congress reveals 
findings from its reviews that “federal managers” were “seriously disadvantaged in their 
efforts to improve program efficiency and effectiveness” due to “insufficient articulation 
of program goals and inadequate information on program performance” (Government 
Performance and Results Act, 1993, p.1). The findings further stated that “congressional 
policymaking, spending decisions, and program oversight were seriously handicapped 
by” insufficient attention to program “performance and results” (Government 
Performance and Results Act, 1993). To rectify these issues, “Congress established 
statutory requirements” within the GPRA for the DOD agencies “to set [agency] goals, 
measure performance,” and engage Congress in the process through submission of 
program plans outlining these goals and performance parameters as well as annual reports 
on program status related to the attainment of the planned goals and performance 
parameters (Brass, 2012, p.2). Specifically, agencies were to develop and furnish to 
Congress three main deliverables: a five-year strategic plan detailing the mission 
statement and measurable long-term agency goals; an annual performance plan 
documenting the performance goals for the respective fiscal year with specifics on how 
the goals would be met and verified; and annual performance reports documenting the 
agency’s accomplishments in terms of meeting the performance goals as planned (Brass, 
2012). The reporting requirements were intended to provide insight to and assist 
Congress in the process of policy formulation, conducting oversight, and budget planning 
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and authorization (Brass, 2012). Performance.gov documents that updates to the GPRA 
were later implemented through the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 directing changes 
to existing requirements in an attempt to help “agencies to focus on their highest 
priorities and creating a culture where data and empirical evidence plays a greater role in 
policy, budget, and management decisions.” One of the changes implemented by the 
Modernization Act according to performance.gov was to “modernize and refine the 
requirements established by GPRA in order to produce more frequent, relevant data 
which can then inform decision makers and agency operations.” Performance.gov 
documents that the act also included legislation to “codify and strengthen existing 
resources for performance management, including the Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
Performance Improvement Officers (PIOs) within the federal agencies, and the 
interagency Performance Improvement Council (PIC)” as well as to “apply the latest 
technologies and lessons learned from nearly two decades of GPRA implementation.”  
3. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
The next wave of reform came in the form of the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 signed into law by President Clinton. At the time, the 
acquisition process was thought to be too complicated and prior to the enactment of the 
law, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote and disseminated a paper entitled 
“Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change” which provided several examples of issues 
facing the acquisition community, specifically related to the purchase of commercial 
items. The paper detailed instances where the current regulations restricted the 
government’s ability to procure state of the art technology from commercial vendors or to 
obtain the most cost effective commercial items on the market due to requirements for 
detailed cost and pricing data. The majority of commercial vendors did not keep the kind 
of in-depth cost and pricing data required for government procurements which resulted in 
substantially increased costs to the vendor to generate the required information on small 
dollar commercial items. These costs were either passed on to the government or, in some 
of the cases documented in the paper, the vendors refused to supply the item preferring to 
protect their relationships with subcontractors instead of passing on the burdensome 
requirement. The paper further explained that the low threshold for simplified 
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acquisitions ended up costing the government more time and money to procure standard, 
low cost, commercial items. Additionally, commercial divisions of major defense 
contractors harbored concerns about complying with the cost and pricing requirements 
for fear of losing their proprietary data and software or relinquishing rights to their 
proprietary pricing information and inviting unwelcomed financial audits by the federal 
government (Perry, 1994). FASA attempted to address these issues by raising the 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold from $25,000 to $100,000, allowing the simplified 
acquisition process to be utilized on commercial purchases up to the redefined threshold 
(Perry, 1994). The act also enabled the Federal government to buy commercial items as 
offered on the market, no longer requiring the furnishing of detailed cost and pricing 
information (Perry, 1994). In addition, the act set commercial items and Non-
Developmental Items (NDI) as the preferred method of acquiring goods for the 
government and defined a commercial item as an item sold on the commercial market for 
purposes other than government use with an allowance for minor modifications to fit 
government needs (Perry, 1994). Through the act, a commercial item can be determined 
fair and reasonable through adequate price competition or, if competition is not feasible, 
the Contracting Officer can obtain pricing information through market analysis (Perry, 
1994).  
4. Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) 
The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 also known as the Clinger-
Cohen Act was designed to improve upon the streamlining provisions of the previously 
enacted FASA further reducing non-value added procedures. The act raises the dollar 
thresholds at which various high level agency approvals are required for contracts 
utilizing other than full and open competition procedures (FARA, 1996). Specifically for 
procurements under other than full and open competition, the requirement for approval 
authority by the Special Competition Advocate was increased from a range of 100,000 to 
1,000,000 to a range of 500,000 to 10,000,000; by the Head of the Contracting Activity 
approval authority was increased from a range of 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 to a range of 
10,000,000 to 50,000,000; and for approval by the Senior Procurement Executive the 
threshold was set at 50,000,000 and above (FARA, 1996). One of the major 
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accomplishments of the act was legislation providing the ability to limit competition or 
set the competitive range at the number of offerors at which effective competition can be 
conducted. With this legislation providing the ability to set the competitive range among 
the most highly rated proposals, the law also set in effect preaward debriefings to provide 
offerors eliminated from the competitive range the opportunity to receive feedback for 
better proposal preparation increasing competition under future efforts. In addition, the 
application of simplified acquisition procedures was expanded to commercial items with 
a purchase value of $5,000,000 or less if the “contracting officer reasonably expects… 
that offers will only include commercial items” (FARA, 1996, p.30). FARA revises 
provisions under FASA in continuing the prohibition of collecting certified cost and 
pricing data on commercial items, however, solidifies the requirement for Contracting 
Officers to obtain other than cost and pricing data in order to document a determination 
of fair and reasonable pricing (Seitzinger, 1996). The act also removes the burden from 
vendors of commercial items of having to comply with Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS). As prescribed by the FARA, the FAR lists competitive contracting provisions that 
are not applicable to contracts for commercially available off-the-shelf items. The act 
further establishes rules surrounding procurement integrity, effectively prohibiting 
current as well as former federal employees from consciously disclosing source selection 
sensitive information including proprietary proposal information prior to the resultant 
contract award (Seitzinger, 1996). 
5. Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) 
The next major step in acquisition reform was the Services Acquisition Reform 
Act (SARA) of 2003 which was instituted in response to the increase in procurement of 
services across the federal government. “SARA enacted much needed changes to respond 
to persistent concerns about the federal procurement workforce—regarding the 
availability of sufficient and appropriate training resources and the loss of experienced 
procurement professionals to retirement and to the private sector” (Clerici & Doyle, 
2004). This piece of legislation established the Acquisition Workforce Training Fund 
(AWTF) for the purpose of ensuring Contracting Officers were properly trained in the 
acquisition of both goods and services (Clerici & Doyle, 2004). The law also established 
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the Acquisition Advisory Panel, an integrated panel of thirteen government and industry 
partners, charged with the responsibility of reporting to Congress and the Office of 
Management and Budget on the acquisition process as well as a civilian acquisition 
officer in each government agency to conduct oversight of the procurement process 
(Clerici & Doyle, 2004). Performance based contracting for services were promoted 
through this law and allowances for use of time and materials or labor hour type contracts 
were made for the procurement of commercial services. “This provision addresses 
longstanding questions in government and industry about the use of these contract types 
to acquire commercial services” (Clerici & Doyle, 2004, p. 40). 
6. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) 
In 2009, the WSARA was signed into law with its chief aim to reduce excessive 
cost growth of major weapons systems that had become commonplace. The WSARA 
attempted to achieve this reform largely by focusing on decisions made early on in the 
life of the program. At the time the act was signed into law, GAO reports cited that 
approximately “70 percent of the Pentagon’s 96 largest weapon programs were over 
budget” (Drew, 2009).  
This reform act documented guidance for conducting the AoA study in the early 
stages of weapons systems planning prior to Milestone A approval to identify the best 
solution in terms of cost, schedule, and operability (Weapons Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act, 2009). The law also mandated the consideration of technology maturity 
standards and the competitive acquisition of prototypes prior to Milestone B approval 
wherever practicable prior to the acquisition of full scale production of large weapons 
systems (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009). As part of this change, a 
requirement was added for the “the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in 
consultation with the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation” to “periodically 
review and assess the technological maturity and integration risk of critical technologies 
of the major defense acquisition programs of the Department of Defense and report on 
the findings of such reviews and assessments to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics” who would report to the Secretary of Defense 
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and ultimately to the Congress (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009, p. 1). 
Additionally, the reform provided for early consideration of operation and sustainment 
requirements necessary to support these large weapons systems throughout the system’s 
life cycle prior to entering into the competitive acquisition of the systems (Weapons 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009).  
The reform act also encompassed a strong push for maximizing competition 
through measures such as the “use of modular, open architectures to enable competition 
for upgrades, the use of build-to-print approaches to enable production through multiple 
sources, and the acquisition of complete technical data packages” to ensure the ability to 
compete follow-on contracts (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2009, p. 1). 
The reform entailed a more rigorous program for systems engineering to be implemented 
starting with the institution of the Director of Systems Engineering who reported to the 
Under Secretary of Defense and was responsible for developing and disseminating 
policies on systems engineering as well as for reviewing, providing approval for, and 
monitoring the systems engineering plans for each MDAP (Weapons Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act, 2009).  
As a result of the WSARA initiative and its focus on systems engineering, 
procedures for developmental and operational testing, milestone decision certification 
processes, and requirements for preliminary design reviews were instituted. A Director of 
Developmental Test and Evaluation was appointed under the Under Secretary of Defense 
and charged to work in coordination with the Director of Systems Engineering to “ensure 
that the developmental test and evaluation activities of the Department of Defense are 
fully integrated into and consistent with the systems engineering and development 
planning processes of the Department” (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 
2009, p. 1).  
The reform also cemented requirements for cost analysis early in the design 
process and appointed the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) 
who would report directly to the Secretary of Defense providing independent assessments 
of matters concerning cost analysis and the planning and programming phases of the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) system. The Director of 
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CAPE was put in place to provide expertise and to define the policies and procedures for 
cost estimation practices for the DOD (Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 
2009). Procedures for performance assessments and root cause analysis were 
implemented allowing for tradeoffs to be made between cost, schedule, and performance 
to obtain the best value weapons systems for the government.  
Lastly, the WSARA provided for “a strengthening of the ‘Nunn-McCurdy’ 
process. Nunn-McCurdy provisions require DOD to report to Congress when cost growth 
on a major program breaches a critical cost growth threshold. Characterized by Senator 
McCain as ‘a big stick … to wield against the very worst performing programs,’ the new 
legislation required a root-cause assessment of failing programs and presumed program 
termination within sixty days of notification unless DOD certified in writing to the 
contrary” (Eide & Allen, 2012, p. 8). This was intended to further limit the excessive cost 
growth being experienced in major weapon system programs in the DOD. 
7. Better Buying Power (BBP) 
The DOD Better Buying Power website states: 
Better Buying Power (BBP) is the implementation of best practices to 
strengthen the Defense Department’s buying power, improve industry 
productivity, and provide an affordable, value-added military capability to 
the Warfighter. Launched in 2010, BBP encompasses a set of fundamental 
acquisition principles to achieve greater efficiencies through affordability, 
cost control, elimination of unproductive processes and bureaucracy, and 
promotion of competition.  
The BBP initiatives attempt to “incentivize productivity and innovation in 
industry and government, and improve tradecraft in the acquisition of services” (DOD 
Better Buying Power website, 2015,p. 1). The BBP was first introduced through the BBP 
1.0 in 2010 as a memorandum entitled “Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending.” As the title infers, the initiative was 
geared toward obtaining better value in DOD acquisitions on behalf of the taxpayer.  
The objectives of BBP 1.0 were to “procure the critical goods and services our 
forces need” getting the best value for the budgeted taxpayer funds, “restore affordability 
to defense goods and services, improve defense industry productivity, remove 
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government impediments to leanness, avoid program turbulence, and maintain a vibrant 
and financially healthy defense industry” (Carter, 2010, p. 4). The slogan attached to the 
initiative which embodied its objectives was to “do more without more” or do more with 
less” (Carter, 2010, p. 4). BBP 1.0 attempted to achieve these objectives through 
providing incentives to industry through aligning “opportunity to earn profits and fees 
both to value to the taxpayer and risk to the contractor, thereby, rewarding higher 
productivity with higher profits” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). This went hand in hand with the 
initiatives to prefer fixed price and cost plus fixed fee type contracts and minimize the 
use of award fee contracts when considering vehicles for development and supply 
requirements. The initiative emphasized the need to maximize competition and to fit the 
right type of contract to the requirement, avoiding the award of sole source Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts along with Time and Materials contracts when 
considering vehicles for the award of services.  
The initiative proposed to ensure that taxpayers receive “adequate consideration 
in the form of price reductions for improved cash flows,” specifically, that “progress 
payments reflect performance but can be increased above customary levels in return for 
consideration by the contractor” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). BBP 1.0 also encouraged the 
acquisition workforce to “identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and [General 
and Administrative] G&A charged to contracts, limit fees for subcontractor management 
to reflect actual value provided (risk assumed by prime and continuous subcontractor risk 
reduction), and to limit Bid and Proposal allowable costs in sole source contracts and 
encourage effective use of Independent Research And Development (IRAD)” (Carter, 
2010, p. 5).  
Additionally, the initiative promoted rewarding excellence among suppliers and 
maximizing small business participation, specifically in situations warranting multiple 
award contracts for services, by pushing for a small business set aside in the event that 
two or more capable small businesses were to bid on such a solicitation (Carter, 2010). 
These objectives were to be accomplished through utilization of independent cost 
estimates based on historical information to project estimated “should cost” objectives. 
The initiative sought to strengthen the acquisition workforce by growing the workforce 
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and raising the skill level leveraging the unique qualities of non-profit Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and University Affiliated Research 
Centers (UARCs) (Carter, 2010).  
Audits were to be improved in terms of consistency and quality across the DOD 
focusing on value added content and affordability was mandated as a requirement and 
should be a major consideration in the requirements and design of new programs. To 
avoid cost escalation, PMs were to seek to stabilize production rates and to seek approval 
from the head of the component authority to adjust production rates downward. PMs 
were also encouraged to “identify where multiple programs are pursuing similar 
objectives” and “eliminate redundancy within warfighting portfolios” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). 
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) were to be set in place across the DOD components 
to manage procurement of services by focusing on “improving policy and practice in this 
high dollar value area” (Carter, 2010, p. 5). The memo encouraged the acquisition 
workforce to “protect the technology base…by sustaining investment while focusing on 
high value-added work” (Carter, 2010, p. 6).  
The update to BBP came in the form of BBP 2.0 issued on 13 November 2012 by 
Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall. The memo entitled “Pursuit for Greater 
Efficiency & Productivity in Defense Spending” continued and furthered the goals of the 
initial BBP initiatives as evidenced in the title with seven focus areas and thirty-six 
additional initiatives. First, affordable programs were to be achieved through 
implementing a system of investment planning designed to identify affordability caps 
which would then be enforced. “Long-term capital investment analysis covering product 
life cycles of thirty or forty years” would become “a standard part of the acquisition 
process under DOD[I] 5000.02. Service and component resource managers and 
leadership [would] conduct portfolio analysis to limit future investment limitations on a 
capital investment portfolio of products, e.g., ground combat vehicles or surface 
combatants” (Kendall, 2012, p. 2). The task of enforcing affordability caps “falls to 
senior leadership, including the [Defense Acquisition Executive] DAE, [Service 
Acquisition Executives] SAEs, and [Component Acquisition Executives] CAEs, who 
must work with the Service and Component leadership to halt programs that will not be 
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within the established cap unless tradeoffs to reduce cost are implemented” (Kendall, 
2012, p. 2). Additionally, the initiative proposed “cost control” throughout the life cycle 
of the product beyond “implement[ing] ‘should cost’ based management” and 
“eliminate[ing] redundancy in warfighter portfolios,” by “measure[ing] a program’s cost 
performance to assess the effectiveness of acquisition policies” by “building stronger 
partnerships with the requirements community,” and by including “defense exportability 
features in the initial program designs” (Kendall, 2012, p. 2).  
Productivity and innovation in industry and government was to incentivized not 
only by utilizing the proper contract types increasing the use of Fixed Price Incentive 
contracts, rewarding excellency among suppliers, expanding the use of IRAD in 
programs, and aligning profitability with department goals, but also by better defining the 
value sought in “best value” competition and in Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
(LPTA) competitions defining technically acceptable in a way that ensures the necessary 
quality. These goals would also be accomplished by increasing the “effective use of 
Performance Based Logistics” and by reducing the “backlog of [Defense Contract Audit 
Agency] DCAA audits without compromising effectiveness” (Kendall, 2012, p. 4). 
“DCAA, with the assistance [Defense Contract Management Agency] DCMA and 
[Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy] DPAP, is increasing audit resources and 
developing a risk-based process for reducing the audit backlog” of contract closeout and 
pre-award audits (Kendall, 2012, p. 4).  
BBP 2.0 also provides guidance to eliminate unproductive processes and 
bureaucracy scaling down the amount of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level 
reviews required and pushing the responsibility and accountability for programs down to 
the level of the PM, PEO, and Acquisition Executive. The guidance also presents a vision 
to eliminate requirements for which the costs outweigh the benefits and “reduce cycle 
times while ensuring sound investment decisions” (Kendall, 2012, p. 4). In addition to 
promoting effective competition through encouraging open system architectures, 
procurement of technical data packages, and increased small business roles and 
opportunities, BBP 2.0 emphasizes identification of risks through the technology 
development phase of the acquisition process and reducing those risks. The initiative also 
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aims to “improve tradecraft in acquisition of services” through “adopting uniform 
services market segmentation, improving requirements definition,” emphasizing market 
research, installing senior managers for service acquisitions, “expanding the use of 
requirements review boards” as well as “strengthening contract management outside the 
normal acquisition chain,” for example at the military installations (Kendall, 2012, pp. 5–
6). Improvements to the professionalism of the acquisition workforce are to be 
accomplished through higher standards for key leadership positions and increasing the 
cost consciousness of the workforce in addition to the previously highlighted objectives 
of elevating professional qualification requirements and increasing recognition of 
excellence in management of acquisitions (Kendall, 2012).  
The third iteration of the BBP was issued by Under Secretary of Defense Frank 
Kendall on 9 April 2014 through a memorandum entitled “Implementation Directive for 
Better Buying Power 3.0–Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical 
Excellence and Innovation.” The updates to BBP included achieving dominant 
capabilities in the process of controlling life cycle costs through planning “for responsive 
and emerging threats by building stronger partnerships of acquisition, requirements and 
intelligence communities, institutionaliz[ing] stronger DOD level Long Range [Research 
and Development] R&D Program Plans, [and strengthening] cybersecurity throughout the 
product life cycle” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 2).  
To continue incentivizing productivity in Industry and Government, BBP 3.0 
proposes to “improve the return on investment in DOD laboratories” and to improve 
incentivizing innovation in Industry and Government, BBP 3.0 proposes to “emphasize 
technology insertion and refresh in program planning, increase the return on and access to 
small business research and development, and provide draft technical requirements to 
industry early and involve industry in funded concept definition” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 2). 
BBP 3.0 attempts to continue its vision to eliminate unproductive processes and 
bureaucracy through “streamline[d] documentation requirements and staff reviews” as 
well as removal of “unproductive requirements imposed on industry” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 
2). The initiative’s vision to promote effective competition is expanded to include 
“improve[ing] DOD outreach for technology and products from global markets” 
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(Kendall, 2015a, p. 2). Improving “the effectiveness and productivity of contract 
engineering and technical services” is added to the objectives to be accomplished under 
improving tradecraft in acquisition of services (Kendall, 2015a, p. 2). In order to 
“improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce,” BBP 3.0 adds to its 
goals guidance to “strengthen organic engineering capabilities, ensure development 
program leadership is technically qualified to manage R&D activities, improve our 
leaders’ ability to understand and mitigate technical risk, and increase DOD support for 
[Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics] STEM education” (Kendall, 
2015a, p. 2). To help implement the various iterations of the BBP, the Business Senior 
Integration Group (BSIG) was created which generally meets monthly to monitor and 
oversee the rollout and execution of BBP (Kendall, 2015a).  
8. 2015 House Defense Committee Planned Reforms of Chairman 
Thornberry 
Currently, the House Defense Committee has proposed the “Agile Acquisition to 
Retain Technological Edge Act” as part of the National Defense Authorization Act which 
is moving through the House and Senate for revisions and approval: “The legislation is 
the product of lengthy committee study of the Pentagon acquisition system, which 
officials and lawmakers of both parties agree too often churns out weapons far over 
budget and behind schedule—or leads the services to cancel them. Former [House Armed 
Services Committee] HASC Chairman Buck McKeon, R-Calif., set in motion the study 
and tapped Thornberry to lead it” (Bennet, 2015, p. 1).  
To be proactive, the bill proposes to empower acquisition officials by 
removing barriers so that officers can pursue acquisition as a profession. It 
would provide a ‘Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund 
[DAWDF]’ and expedited hiring authority for hiring and training the 
acquisition workforce. The bill also would give acquisition PMs greater 
flexibility to address programmatic risk and enable the selection of 
contract types that best meet program objectives with an appropriate level 
of risk. (American Society of Military Comptrollers website, 2015, p. 1).  
The bill’s acquisition reforms would pursue five objectives, including: (1) 
Clarify the role of senior officials to streamline decision making and 
promote accountability, while elevating the role of the service chiefs to 
decentralize authority; (2) Develop flexible alternative acquisition 
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“pathways” to allow accelerated prototyping and field testing within five 
years, while allowing more acquisition authority to the U.S. Cyber 
Command; (3) Improve access to non-traditional and commercial 
contractors to encourage competition and innovation; (4) Reduce 
unnecessary requirements, reports and certifications to streamline 
purchasing of weapons, services and information technology; and (5) 
Improve the quality of the acquisition workforce by renewing its 
development fund and establishing direct-hire authorities for employees 
with science, technology, engineering and math skills. (Clark, 2015, p. 1). 
C. RELEVANT STUDIES ON DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS AND 
REFORMS 
1. Gansler Report 
In November 2007, the report of the “Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations,” otherwise known as the Gansler 
Report, was released, which detailed findings from a commission chartered by the 
Secretary of the Army, General Geren. In response to contracting issues discovered 
primarily through wartime contracts that were faltering in Kuwait, the Secretary of the 
Army commissioned a panel to do a comparative analysis of contracting and prepare an 
independent report of their findings. Members of the commission included Dr. Jacques S. 
Gansler, Chairman of the commission and former Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics); David Berteau, former Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics); Dave Maddox, General, U.S. 
Army (Retired), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe; Dave Oliver, Rear 
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq; Lee Salomon, General, U.S. Army (Retired), 
former Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command; and George Singley, former Deputy 
Director, Defense Research & Engineering (Gansler, Berteau, Maddox, Oliver, Salomon, 
& Singley, 2007). These subject-matter experts in acquisition sought to examine the 
contracting process and provide to the Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense a 
brutal and honest investigation and assessment of Army contracting. In preparing the 
report, the commission interviewed over 100 people who were experienced in 
contingency contracting in the ongoing conflict areas of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait 
(Gansler et al., 2007). “The most notable characteristic of the testimony is a nearly 
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unanimous perception of the current problems, their gravity, and the urgent need for 
reform. The people in the field understand the issues and identified the necessary 
solutions, and the Commission recommendations reflect these valuable lessons learned” 
(Gansler et al., 2007, p. 2).  
The Commission found that the following critical segments of the 
‘Institutional Army’ have not adapted in order to enable responsive 
acquisitions and sustainment for expeditionary operations. Specifically, [in 
the areas of] financial management, civilian and military personnel, 
contracting and contract management, Training and education, and 
Doctrine, regulations, and processes. These key failures encumber the 
Army acquisition system’s performance and have significantly contributed 
to the waste, fraud, and abuse in-theater by Army personnel. (Gansler et 
al., 2007, p. 1).  
The report went on to say that:  
the expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced 
military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Yet, only 3 
percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there 
are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer (GO) 
positions. The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, 
trained, structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the twenty-
first Century deployed warfighters. Only 56 percent of the military 
officers and 53 percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are 
certified for their current positions. Notwithstanding a seven-fold 
workload increase and greater complexity of contracting, the Institutional 
Army is not supporting this key capability. Notwithstanding there being 
almost as many contractor personnel in the Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan 
Theater as there are U.S. military, the Operational Army does not yet 
recognize the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary 
operations and on mission success. What should be a core competence—
contracting (from requirements definition, through contract management, 
to contract closeout)—is treated as an operational and institutional side 
issue. (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 2).  
The commission proposed recommendations or solutions in four areas including 
personnel, organizational responsibility, training and tools, and legislative/regulatory.  
Specifically, (1) Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of 
military and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary 
operations); (2) Restructure organization and restore responsibility to 
facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and 
CONUS operations; (3) Provide training and tools for overall contracting 
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activities in expeditionary operations; and (4) Obtain legislative, 
regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in 
expeditionary operations. (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 5).  
The commission recommended that in terms of personnel, the military should 
make acquisition its own career track for officers and enlisted where they are groomed in 
cradle to grave contracting as a profession throughout their career; however, the 
commission advised against making expeditionary contracting a first assignment as 
extensive training is necessary to prepare a candidate for this function. The commission 
further recommended that military leadership should be placed over the contracting 
command in the form of a set of ten General Officers and “a separate Army Contracting 
Promotion Board [be established] for both military and civilian contracting professionals 
and ensure functional independence of contracting professionals” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 
48). The report recommended the establishment of a separate and centrally managed 
Contracting Corps for both Army and civilian acquisition professionals.  
In terms of organizational responsibility, the commission stated that “the Army 
should not separate a contracting corps from weapons systems or base operations 
contracting” because non-expeditionary contracting experiences offer a benefit in 
learning “how to best support the warfighter while operating within the bounds of sound 
and legal business judgment; and under the ‘special provisions’ allowable under the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation for such expedited needs” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 6). The 
report also emphasized the need for the Army to have a customer interface for the 
purpose of translating “requirements into statements of work that quickly and seamlessly 
can be placed on contract” and to have contracting personnel conducting contingency 
contracting in theater with the customers they support (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 6). The 
commission recommended the institution of a Deputy for Contracting and Director of the 
Contracting Corps as a Major General billet reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. “This staff position is responsible for 
all contracting policy and all contracting career management, including establishing and 
maintaining education and training standards for the civilian and military contracting 
workforce” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 51). The report also recommended the establishment 
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of an Army Contracting Command, an Expeditionary Contracting Command, and an 
Installation Contracting Command. 
To address training and tools, the commission recommended that contracting 
professionals in the expeditionary field have access to necessary information technology 
and e-business tools to be able to access sample documents and similar situational 
solutions while in theater. Additionally, the need to capture lessons learned from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom should be documented and 
taught to acquisition leaders and professionals as part of a training curriculum before they 
are introduced to expeditionary contracting. Finally, the committee recommended that an 
“Expeditionary Contracting Manual [be produced] that is focused on the expedited 
processes and flexibilities necessary for procuring the support needed by our warfighters 
in an expeditionary operation…, provide incentives for civilian contracting personnel to 
ensure that the Army can tap into its largest population of contracting expertise…,” and 
provide “personnel policies that support the roles they may be tasked to serve when the 
U.S. is engaged in expeditionary military operations. The Army should do a complete 
personnel policy review to identify changes necessary to support, properly incentivize, 
discipline, and provide for its civilian personnel who may be engaged in expeditionary 
military operations” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 8). The Report discussed the need to add 
billets (up to 583 for Army support alone) to DCMA and provide them with the authority 
properly and consistently conduct management of contracts in times of peace and war 
including the management of all expeditionary contracting and all post, camp, and station 
contract management. With regard to legislation, Gansler stated at a press briefing at the 
Pentagon introducing the findings that:  
we want to have a provision which the Congress approved for the Balkans 
and has not yet approved for Iraq, and yet even in the case of the Balkans, 
they didn’t fully fund it, so it wasn’t very valuable to have the law unless 
you fund the law. So we feel this is important, and we did emphasize that 
to them…. And then the other thing is being able to waive the buy-
America, which again in Iraq they have done because you’ve got to be 
able to buy stuff while you’re there right away. But on the other hand, 
there should be a standby provision for doing the same thing the next 
place we go. And we’ll need provisions built into the law to do that. 
(Gansler and Secretary Geren, 2007, p. 1).  
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2. Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project 
On June 7, 2005, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
Project was instituted by the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time, Gordon 
England, to conduct a thorough examination of the acquisition process from requirements 
generation to the organization, its legal foundations, decision methodologies, oversight, 
and the checks and balances applied to each arena (Kadish, Abbott, Cappuccio, Hawley, 
Kern, & Kozlowski, 2005). The intent for commissioning this panel and tasking them 
with the analysis was to recommend a simplified acquisition structure and set of 
processes that clearly defined responsibilities, lines of authority, and accountability. The 
findings of the panel were published in December 2005 and at the time that this study 
was commissioned,  
[one hundred and twenty-eight] prior studies [had] been done over many 
years to address perceived problems with the system and to prevent fraud, 
waste and abuse. In fact, [the panel] observed historical evidence that cost 
and schedule instability has been a problem in past system acquisitions, 
since the Revolutionary War….We concluded that the problems were 
deeply embedded in many of the management systems we use in DOD, 
not just the traditional acquisition process. (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 2).  
The panel “reviewed over 1,500 documents to establish a baseline of previous 
acquisition reform recommendations, held open meetings and operated a public website 
to obtain public input, heard from 107 experts, received over 170 hours of briefings, 
conducted a detailed survey and interviews of over 130 government and industry 
acquisition professionals, and subsequently developed 1,069 observations” (Kadish et al., 
2005, p. 2). Out of the observations, the panel arrived at forty-two focus areas for reform 
which could be characterized in the following six groups:  Organization, Workforce, 
Budget, Requirements, Acquisition, and Industry (Kadish et al., 2005). “DAPA’s major 
findings included recognition that the industrial base had consolidated significantly since 
the mid-eighties and that the nature of the post-Cold War security environment placed a 
premium on flexibility and technological exploitation” (Eide & Allen, 2012, p. 104). 
Specifically, some of DAPA’s major findings included the necessity for the acquisition 
system to deal with external instability especially in terms of evolving security 
environments and complex national issues (Eide & Allen, 2012). The panel found that the 
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DOD management process and structure was predicated upon distrust of the acquisition 
professional with a preference of a micro-management style oversight over accountability 
(Kadish et al., 2005). Additionally, the oversight process was program focused versus 
process focused further complicating issues. From the analysis, the panel realized that 
complicated acquisition processes increased cost and elongated schedule instead of 
resulting in the initially intended outcomes (Kadish et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
analysis showed that the DOD frequently embraced measures that resulted in short term 
savings and flexibility which later materialized as cost increases later in the life of the 
program. The DAPA panel recommended that the DOD processes be stabilized to be 
successful and replace quantity of reviews with quality reviews. The panel’s conclusion 
were that “an effective Acquisition System requires stability and continuity that can only 
be developed through integration of the major elements upon which it depends” (Kadish 
et al., 2005, p. 7). Those elements being the following: organizational structure; the 
workforce or talent that drives the system and makes it functional; the budgetary function 
which allocates and prioritizes resources; the acquisition requirements that define the 
DOD procurement needs; acquisition processes that manage the development of 
emergent military capabilities; and the industrial base that builds those new capabilities 
(Kadish et al., 2005, p. 7). The DAPA project report went on to say,  
Ideally, all of these entities must work in harmony to provide a stable and 
predictable environment that will ensure an effective, efficient Acquisition 
System. In practice, there are fundamental disconnects in the Department 
of Defense management systems and Congressional oversight. Competing 
values and objectives create unrecognized government-induced instability 
in our acquisition process. (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 7).  
The panel recommended reduction of instability through transformation of those 
major elements. For organization, the panel suggested that the DOD “realign authority, 
accountability and responsibility at the appropriate level and streamline the acquisition 
oversight process” (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 8). In terms of the workforce, the DOD was 
encouraged to build up and place a higher value on the acquisition workforce while also 
providing incentives to leadership. The DOD was urged to “transform the budgeting 
process and establish a distinct Acquisition Stabilization Account to add oversight 
throughout the process” (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 8). With regard to requirements 
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development, the recommendation was to “replace [Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System] JCIDS with [Combatant Command] COCOM-led requirements 
procedures in Services, and DOD agencies must compete to provide solutions” as well as 
“add an ‘operationally acceptable’ test evaluation category and give program managers 
explicit authority to defer requirements” (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 8). The panel advocated 
for strategizing acquisitions to “shift time-certain development procedures [and adopting] 
a risk-based source selection process” as well as changing “from a focus on 100 percent 
performance in the first production lot to a focus on delivering useful military capability 
within six yea[r]s of Milestone A” (Kadish et al., 2005, p. 8). On the Industry side the 
panel suggested “[overcoming] the consequences of reduced demand by sharing long 
range plans and restructuring competitions for new programs with the goal of motivating 
industry investments in future technology and performance on current programs” (Kadish 
et al., 2005, p. 8).  
3. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
The DOD, in its continued quest to increase the efficiency of the acquisition 
process, underwent another review this time by the GAO which examined the milestone 
decision process.  
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated 
GAO to review DOD’s weapon system acquisition process. This report 
examines (1) the effort and value involved in the preparation for a 
milestone decision; (2) factors that influence the time needed to complete 
the milestone decision process; and (3) alternative processes used by some 
DOD programs and leading commercial firms. To perform this work, 
GAO examined the levels of review and information requirements that are 
part of DOD’s process. GAO surveyed twenty-four PMs and forty other 
DOD officials on the value and the time to complete milestone 
documentation. For fifteen program offices, [GAO] gathered data on the 
time to complete the entire milestone decision process [and] discussed 
with DOD officials the factors that lead to inefficiencies. GAO also 
examined practices used by some classified DOD programs and five 
commercial firms generally recognized as leaders in product development. 
(GAO, 2015, p. 2).  
The result of this review was a GAO report released on February 24, 2015, 
entitled  
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Acquisition Reform: DOD Should Streamline Its Decision-Making 
Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies.” According to the 
report, “the acquisition programs GAO surveyed spent, on average, over 
two years completing numerous information requirements for their most 
recent milestone decision, yet acquisition officials considered only about 
half of the requirements as high value. The requirements, in total, 
averaged 5,600 staff days to document. (GAO, 2015, p. 2).  
The report went on to say  
the DOD’s review process is a key factor that influences the time needed 
to complete information requirements. The process in some instances can 
include up to fifty-six organizations at eight levels and accounts for about 
half of the time needed to complete information requirements. Most PMs 
felt that these reviews added high value to only 10 percent of the 
documents. (GAO, 2015, p. 2).  
As a result of the study, the GAO realized that some level of reduction of reviews 
and information requirements is necessary without handicapping the DOD’s ability to 
conduct meaningful oversight. The GAO report published two recommendations for 
further study in these areas, one short term strategy and one long term. In the near term, 
the GAO recommended that the DOD attempt to  
identify and potentially eliminate (1) reviews associated with information 
requirements, with a specific focus on reducing review levels that do not 
add value, and (2) information requirements that do not add value and are 
no longer needed. For the remaining reviews and information 
requirements, evaluate and determine different approaches, such as 
consolidating information requirements and delegating approval authority, 
which could provide for a more efficient milestone process. This effort 
should also include a re-examination of the reason(s) why an information 
requirement was originally considered necessary in order to determine 
what information is still needed and if a more efficient approach could be 
used. (GAO, 2015, p. 31).  
as a longer-term effort, select several current or new major defense 
acquisition programs to pilot, on a broader scale, different approaches for 
streamlining the entire milestone decision process, with the results 
evaluated and reported for potential wider use. The pilot programs should 
consider the following: (1) Defining the appropriate information needed to 
support milestone decisions while still ensuring program accountability 
and oversight. The information should be based on the business case 
principles needed for well-informed milestone decisions including well 
defined requirements, reasonable life-cycle cost estimates, and a 
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knowledge-based acquisition plan. (2) Developing an efficient process for 
providing this information to the milestone decision authority by (a) 
minimizing any reviews between the program office and the different 
functional staff offices within each chain of command level and (b) 
establishing frequent, regular interaction between the program office and 
milestone decision makers, in lieu of documentation reviews, to help 
expedite the process. (GAO, 2015, p. 31).  
At present, the agencies are considering implementing these recommendations for 
the next wave of acquisition reform. 
D. RECENT WORKFORCE COMPOSITION AND THE IMPACT OF 
FURLOUGH EVENTS OVER THE PREVIOUS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
It is difficult to identify a confident and consistent estimate of the number of DOD 
acquisition professionals, however, the best estimate is from a panel report to the House 
Committee on Armed Services in March, 2012 that estimates there are 151,608 total 
acquisition personnel in the DOD, consisting of 135,981 civilians and 15,627 military 
personnel. However, this number does not include support service contractors that 
perform acquisition-related support to the government, which would likely cause that 
number to increase (Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense, 
2012).  
The workforce composition and operating environments over the previous 
twenty-five year period has been a consistently challenging environment. During the 
1990s, the size of the acquisition workforce was decreased, leading to a reduced number 
of acquisition personnel in the Department of Defense and “increased the risk of poor 
contract planning, management, and oversight” (Challenges to Doing Business with the 
Department of Defense, 2012, p. 1). During the 2000s, there was a substantial increase in 
the amount of contracting being performed, mainly due to fighting two wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq while the workforce itself was decreasing in number. In multiple 
congressionally-directed reports, audits, and investigations, policy makers questioned 
whether the DOD “had the right mix of acquisition workforce personnel trained and 
equipped” to perform their job functions (Challenges to Doing Business with the 
Department of Defense, 2012, p. 1). Currently, there are concerns with the lack of 
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experience and expertise in DOD acquisition professionals due to retirements and 
reductions in the workforce that has persisted over this period (Challenges to Doing 
Business with the Department of Defense, 2012, p. 1).  
1. Furloughs (1990s and 2013) 
During the 1990s, according to the Bancroft Library Regional Oral History Office 
of the University of California at Berkeley, the DOD acquisition workforce was impacted 
by furloughs to civilian employees of the federal government on multiple occasions. A 
few of the most notable were two separate furloughs between November 14, 1995 and 
January 6, 1996 totaling twenty-six days in all according to bancroft.university.edu. The 
1995–1996 furloughs were provoked by a budgetary standoff between the White House 
and the Congress, which resulted in a government shutdown. The shutdown affected all 
“non-essential” civilian employees of the federal government and was brought about by 
heated disagreements “between Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich over domestic spending cuts for the fiscal year 1996 
budget” as documented on bancroft.university.edu. Specifically, the President and House 
Speaker disagreed over funding for Medicare, education, the environment, and public 
health. The impasse and eventual government shutdown did not bring about the intended 
agreement; however, it did result in a bipartisan agreement to balance the budget over the 
next seven years. Prior to the shutdown, the federal government was operating under 
Continuing Resolution, which dictates that in the absence of a congressional funding 
appropriation no new programs may be initiated and all existing programs should operate 
at the prior year’s appropriation level according to bancroft.university.edu.  
As a result, it has been estimated in the Washington, D.C., area alone that “one 
fifth of federal contracts were put on hold, with many employees furloughed. Many of 
these contractors were not reimbursed” (Office of Chairman, Fairfax County Board of 
Supervisors, 2013, p. 2). Following the 1995–1996 government shutdown, the Furlough 
Protection Act of 1995 was passed, which provides for the “temporary continuance of 
basic civilian and military pay and associated benefits and allowances of federal and 
District of Columbia personnel during any period of lapsed appropriations in which they 
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perform service or are furloughed due to the failure to timely enact appropriations 
legislation for the employee’s agency” (S.1246, 104th Congress, 1995, p. 1). 
Government furloughs would impact the acquisition workforce approximately a 
decade and a half later when budgetary conflicts rose to the forefront of political 
discourse once again. On August 2, 2011, the President signed into law the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 as a measure to deal with the ongoing debt-ceiling crisis that 
threatened to send the nation into default the following day. As part of the act, 
sequestration was implemented which required automatic budget cuts across the DOD 
agencies as a measure to decrease spending at a faster pace than the nation’s credit limit 
was increased. The onset of sequestration triggered furloughs of federal civilian 
employees across the services for seventeen days in 2013. In the years leading up to the 
furloughs and during furloughs, federal programs were operating for the majority of the 
year under continuing resolution authority, mandating no new start programs and existing 
programs were not to progress past the funding allotted from the previous year’s 
appropriation level.  
Budget constraints, an uncertain fiscal environment, and the commencement of 
furloughs were anticipated to have wide ranging impacts on federal acquisition programs 
for technology and the acquisition workforce. Specifically, the acquisition chiefs of the 
various services “warned members of the House Armed Services Committee that the 
ongoing budget uncertainty is putting the nation at risk” crediting “halted development 
programs, hiring freezes, and narrowing technological advantages” (Roulo, 2013, p. 1). 
Ms. Heidi Shyu, the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology, illuminated the adverse impact with regard to stability’s central role in 
conducting successful acquisitions stating that “Our capacity to maintain expertise in 
science and technology, engineering, contracting, cost estimation [and] logistics are all at 
risk because one of the most attractive benefits to the government employee -- the 
stability -- has been undermined” (Roulo, 2013, p. 1). The Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Sean J. Stackley, claimed that 
“maintaining current readiness and forward presence to the extent possible under 
sequestration comes at expense to our investment in future readiness. In fiscal year 2014 
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alone, absent congressional action or mitigating circumstances, the continuing resolution 
and sequestration would cause cancelled procurements of up to three major warships and 
twenty-five aircraft” (Roulo, 2013, p. 1).  
The acquisition chiefs further stated that sequestration as a whole, would end up 
costing the government more than it would save through the extreme measures 
implemented. William A. LaPlante, the Air Force’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Acquisition claimed that “cuts to development programs will drive up unit costs and 
are already delaying testing” (Roulo, 2013, p. 1). According to Ms. Shyu, upwards of 192 
Army programs could be affected across the life of sequestration “noting that some of the 
most significant repercussions would be felt in the AH-64E Apache and CH-47 Chinook 
helicopter programs” and that “the Army [would] be in danger of losing the production 
contracts entirely…exposing the government to $77 million in termination liabilities and 
a $1.4-billion increase in costs….Ultimately, the ability to be good stewards of public 
funds depends upon a stable, predictable and adequate funding environment” (Roulo, 
2013, p. 1).  
Although the October 2013 shutdown was shorter than the twenty-one day 
shutdown that took place in December 1995 – January 1996, the total 
number of employee furlough days was larger, even if one adjusts for 
growth in the size of the Federal workforce. This is largely because seven 
appropriations bills were enacted before the start of the December 1995 – 
January 1996 shutdown, so several major agencies were able to operate 
normally during that period of time. By contrast, as of October 1, 2013, no 
agencies had received full Fiscal Year 2014 annual appropriations. One 
way to quantify the cost of furloughs is in terms of the amount the Federal 
Government had to pay for work not performed. [The White House] 
estimate[s] that the total cost of pay due to federal employees furloughed 
during the shutdown is roughly $2.0 billion; total compensation costs are 
about 30 percent larger (about $2.5 billion). This exceeds the comparable 
payroll costs of $430 million (about $650 million in todays’ dollars) for 
the November 1995 shutdown and $630 million (about $1 billion in 
today’s dollars) for the December 1995 – January 1996 shutdown. 
(Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2013, p. 13).  
The GAO is currently conducting reviews to identify the actual effects of the 
furloughs and of ongoing sequestration. 
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2. Recent Trends in Acquisition Workforce Composition 
Recently, the DOD has received mostly positive reviews for its attempts to 
rebuild the acquisition workforce towards the end of the 2000s and as it enters the next 
decade. This is a result of the Secretary of Defense’s Acquisition Workforce Growth 
Initiative, which targeted adding 20,000 civilians to the acquisition workforce by 2015 
(Gates et al., 2013). To achieve this goal, it included the “in-sourcing” and conversion of 
the DOD acquisition-related jobs performed by contractors to civilian positions within 
the DOD (Gates et al., 2013). The Secretary believed the DOD had become too reliant on 
service contractors to perform these job functions on behalf of the government. A 
secondary goal was to improve the “capacity and skill sets that had been eroded in the 
years that followed the downsizing of the workforce in the 1990s” (GAO, 2011, p. 3). 
Congress provided the resources to assist in this initiative by creating the DAWDF to 
fund the hiring of DOD acquisition professionals (Challenges to Doing Business with the 
Department of Defense, 2012).  
As part of the Secretary’s growth initiative, the DOD acquisition workforce grew 
by 24,571 civilians by 2011, which exceeded the Secretary’s initial goal of an additional 
20,000 acquisition workforce civilians (Gates et al., 2013). Just prior to 2011, the 
Secretary announced that he was ending his workforce initiative and in March of 2011 
instituted a DOD-wide hiring freeze for the entire civilian workforce, including the 
acquisition workforce. This hiring freeze was caused by uncertainty surrounding the 
Service’s budgets in future years (GAO, 2011). As a result of the focus placed on 
increasing the DOD’s civilian acquisition workforce, the percentage of the DOD’s 
workforce that was categorized in an acquisition-related field increased from a relatively 
steady 10 to 12 percent from Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 and earlier to 17 percent in FY 2011, 
an increase of 5 to 7 percent in ten years (Gates et al., 2013).  
Recent trends, based upon data provided by the DOD to the Rand Corporation for 
analysis, show that between FY 2008 and FY 2011, the attrition rate, or percentage of 
workforce that leaves the DOD acquisition workforce, is fairly consistent at a low rate of 
departure, especially when compared to the entire DOD civilian workforce. Rand 
Corporation theorizes that this may be caused by a lower number of voluntary or 
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involuntary separations offered to the DOD acquisition workforce and because of poor 
economic conditions as a result of the Great Recession (Gates et al., 2013).  
Because of an influx of less experienced acquisition workforce civilian personnel 
and more senior and experienced acquisition personnel being close to retirement, it has 
created what is referred to as the “new hire bulge” and the “retirement bulge,” which 
leads to a “bathtub effect” of less experienced acquisition professionals on one end of the 
spectrum and a concentration of more experienced acquisition professionals on the 
opposite side that is nearing retirement, with a lack of mid-range acquisition 
professionals to fill in the gap (Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of 
Defense, 2012). Almost half of the DOD acquisition workforce had less than ten years of 
experience in federal service while approximately 4 percent of the DOD acquisition 
workforce became eligible for retirement beginning in FY 2007 continuing at the same 
rate over the following ten years (Gates et al., 2013). This leaves a gap in that “mid-
career personnel are not abundant enough to adequately replace the retirement bulge, nor 
provide for enough on-hands mentoring to the new-hire bulge” (Challenges to Doing 
Business with the Department of Defense, 2012). 
E. INCREASED USE OF AUTOMATED SYSTEMS TO AID IN THE 
ACQUISITION PROCESS OVER THE PREVIOUS TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS 
Due to changes and growth in the technology available to assist the acquisition 
workforce in conducting its daily tasks, it has become an integrated part of the daily tasks 
performed by the DOD acquisition workforce as part of their job requirements. One of 
those uses of technologies is the Paperless Contracting Files (PCF) currently utilized by 
the U.S. Army Contracting Command - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG), Natick 
Contracting Division (NCD). The development, testing, and timeline of release will be 
researched as a singular example to see the impact of technology reforms in the daily 
tasks of the DOD acquisition workforce.  
The use of metrics and other data systems will also be investigated from a holistic 
standpoint to identify the impact to the acquisition workforce by their increased use due 
to the improvements in technology.  
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1. Paperless Contract Files (PCF) 
The ACC mandated use of PCF as the official record of the contracting file for 
contracting professionals within the command beginning in FY 2013. PCF is a web-based 
application that allows for use either in or outside of the office. It is secure and accessible 
with use of a Common Access Card (CAC). It also offers a workflow and review function 
that mimics standard business processes (Paperless Contract Files (PCF), 2015).  
The first pilot program of what finally led to the use of PCF began in May 1998 
and concluded in June 1999 when former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Procurement) (DASA(P)) requested NCD to participate in a paperless contracting 
environment to “prove the concept” of paperless contracting (O’Day, 1999). This pilot 
program also included what became Wide Area Workflow (WAWF), which is the 
paperless invoicing system for DD250s utilized by the DOD, and Army Single Face to 
Industry (ASFI), which is utilized to release notices of intent to solicit and award 
requirements and to provide industry access to solicitation documents for proposal 
submission (O'Day, 1999).  
The pilot study was initiated to meet the DOD goals of “maximum elimination of 
paper transactions by year 2000” (O’Day, 1999, p.1). The pilot program was considered a 
success and recommended for further investigation for utilization to meet the DOD’s goal 
(O'Day, 1999). Specific to PCF, internal NCD emails provided as part of the research for 
this topic indicated that PCF would be deployed in the Spring/Summer of 2008. As stated 
above, a workable PCF solution was not mandated for use until FY 2013, which is 
thirteen years after the DOD preferred to have the maximum elimination of paper 
transactions, of which, contract files are a major part. It is also five years after NCD’s 
headquarters at ACC-APG was notified of an impending implementation of PCF.  
2. Use of Automated Reporting and Metrics Based Tracking 
To accommodate the goals of the various acquisition reform initiatives, the DOD 
needed to be able to track its progress and to do this the services needed to move toward 
automated systems for data collection allowing greater visibility and increasingly real-
time information. This move began with a policy memorandum issued on May 21, 1997, 
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from the then-Under Secretary of Defense (USD), John J. Hamre, who disseminated 
written direction from the Secretary of Defense that the services “undertake a revolution 
in business practices in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review. [The 
Secretary of Defense] has specifically cited the need to simplify and modernize our 
acquisition process in the area of contract writing, administration, finance, and auditing” 
(Hamre, 1997, p. 1). The memorandum went on to say that  
in order to determine the feasibility of sweeping changes in this area, I am 
requesting the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) 
to develop, by July 1, the blueprint of a plan to move to a totally paper-
free contract writing, administration, finance, and auditing process. This 
plan should be coordinated with all of the organizations that participate in 
the integrated process. The plan should incorporate the Department’s 
ongoing initiatives for use of purchase cards, electronic catalogues, 
electronic commerce and imaging. (Hamre, 1997, p. 1). 
As part of the directive to stand up paperless contract writing and administrative 
systems, the Standard Procurement System (SPS), also known as Procurement Desktop-
Defense (PD2), was generated. SPS was anticipated to be the initial step towards 
paperless contracting with the intention of achieving a totally paper free acquisition 
process by the year 2000 (Bennet, 1998). “The SPS is a standardized automated 
procurement system for use by the DOD procurement community…. The program also 
includes deployment of a Shared Data Warehouse, and interfaces between PD2 and 
legacy logistics systems, training and support” (Bennet, 1998, p. 37). According to the 
website for the PD2 developer, CACI, SPS provides the ability to automate and control a 
procurement from initial solicitation through award and contract administration and 
eventually close-out in a desktop environment for efficient paperless contracting. The 
PD2 interface allows simplified “document management, electronic routing and approval, 
[a] web-based reference library with both the federal and DOD acquisition regulations, 
the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS)” and miscellaneous reporting capabilities 
as well as “improved funds management,” visibility, and support for a variety contract 
actions (CACI.com, 2015). Required by the Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006, the FPDS system is a supplemental system interfacing with 
PD2 that reports data from the contract writing system to the publicly accessible 
USASpending.gov. According to Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, reports are 
 53 
required through the FPDS for all contract awards over $3,000 and every modification 
issued thereafter (Federal Acquisition Regulation System, 2007). This information is 
updated on the USASpending.gov website daily for near real-time status and open 
transparency into government transactions. Following the creation of SPS, the 
government initiated the Electronic Document Access (EDA) system which served as an 
online repository of government contracts. Contracting professionals were directed to 
input the contract awards, their attachments, and subsequent modifications in the system 
for simplified information exchange with the global contracts community. EDA also 
served as an electronic communications portal between the authorized system users in the 
contracting field and the payment processors at Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS) for the issuance and resolution of contract deficiency reports. 
To address the need for paperless finance and auditing systems, the services 
instituted a set of systems known as the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), which have 
been utilized across the Services to track funds as well as property (DOD’s Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system Implementation Efforts, 2011). The concept of utilizing 
ERP systems came from the Federal Information Auditability Readiness (FIAR) plan 
circulated for the first time in 2005, to carry out directives established in earlier reforms 
such as the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act of 1996  (DOD’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system 
Implementation Efforts, 2011). To comply with the mandate for an automated finance 
and auditing system, the Services each employed their version of the ERP. The ERPs 
were instituted to enhance the services’ ability to address longstanding vulnerabilities in 
financial management and attain audit readiness. Each service contracted for and 
employed their own version of the ERP. The Navy instituted the Navy ERP (NERP), the 
Army instituted the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and the Air 
Force instituted the Defense Enterprise and Accounting Management System (DEAMS) 
(DOD’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system Implementation Efforts, 2011). The 
NERP system was designed to provide: 
… improved financial discipline, improved accuracy with automated entry 
of key data fields and an audit trail associating users and electronic 
documents with transactions [as well as] … a single system for budgeting, 
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funds availability, and execution across all major acquisition commands” 
according to Eric Fanning, Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy and 
Deputy Chief Management Officer, U.S. Navy (DOD’s Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system Implementation Efforts, 2011, p. 1).  
Similarly, Mark Lewis, Deputy Chief Management Officer for the U.S. Army, 
stated at the same hearing that GFEBS was designed to “consolidate the management and 
reporting of…general funds and assets across the Army enterprise. GFEBS also provides 
for real property accountability” (DOD’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system 
Implementation Efforts, 2011, p. 1). David Tillotson III, Deputy Chief Management 
Officer for the U.S. Air Force, testified that  
the Air Force uses thirty-six Financial Management systems, nine of 
which will be retired from use by the Air Force with [DEAMS] Full 
Operating Capability (FOC). At FOC, the Air Force expects to save on 
average $18M annually by the replacement of legacy information 
technology systems. The remaining systems are not being subsumed 
because they contain core functionality outside the DEAMS program 
scope (e.g., Budget Formulation, Funds Distributions), or are being 
addressed by other ERP systems (e.g., Military Pay in [Air Force-
Integrated Personnel and Pay System] AF-IPPS, and Working Capital 
Fund Accounting in [Expeditionary Combat Support System] ECSS). 
(DOD’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system Implementation 
Efforts, 2011, p. 1).   
The move toward automated systems continued when the then-Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Mr. Jacques S. Gansler, issued a memorandum 
entitled “Collection of Past Participation Information in the Department of Defense” on 
November 20, 1997 stating that: 
automation of collection and retrieval of [Past Participation Information] 
PPI is critical to full implementation of this policy. The Deputy Under 
Secretary for Defense (Logistics), Life Cycle Information Integration 
Office is responsible for conducting an automated pilot effort to define the 
DOD interfaces to existing PPI systems and demonstrate an integrated past 
performance collection capability. (Gansler, 1997, p. 1).  
This plan eventually manifested in automated systems for recording past 
performance information, called Past Performance Information Retrieval System 
(PPIRS), and an automated system for retrieving the information, called Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reports System (CPARS). Additionally, other systems were 
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implemented to ensure contractor performance and viability such as the Central 
Contractor Registry (CCR), Online Representations and Certifications Application 
(ORCA), Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), System for Award Management (SAM), 
and Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). The CCR 
was implemented after the passage of the Central Contractor Registry Act of 2004, which 
directed the Secretary of Defense to maintain a centralized, electronic database for the  
registration of sources of property and services (contractors) who seek to 
participate in contracts and other procurements entered into by various 
Federal procurement officials. [The Act] requires the Registry to include 
certain tax-related information for each contractor, including their 
taxpayer identification numbers and authorization for the Secretary of 
Defense to obtain verification of such numbers from the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue [and] makes contractors who do not register such 
information, or who register invalid information, ineligible for contracts 
entered into under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 
of 1949. (S.2383, 2004, p. 1).  
Likewise, in 2004, the ORCA system was implemented as a result of President 
Bush signing into law the eGovernment Act of 2002 (DOD ORCA.ppt, 2004). The 
central goal of the legislation was to replace the system previously in place, which relied 
on paper documentation and lacked the open accessibility and transparency afforded by 
an online functionality. Upon registration by the contractor, the ORCA system 
prepopulated with the previously input CCR information (DOD ORCA.ppt, 2004). The 
contractor may then enter their representations and certifications and, rather than having 
to resubmit for every new solicitation, the contractor can certify that the representations 
and certifications are current, accurate, and complete or revise them as necessary (DOD 
ORCA.ppt, 2004). Complimenting these systems is the EPLS, which was established as 
an online catalogue of debarred or suspended contractors no longer eligible for award of 
federal contracts or subcontracts (Ginman, 2011). The CCR, ORCA, and EPLS systems 
were combined in 2012, through the SAM in an effort to eliminate redundancies and 
reduce the burden on contractors by providing a single interface according to the website, 
Regulations.gov. The information from the three systems transitioned automatically to 
the new SAM upon implementation. The Federal Acquisition Regulations require that 
contractors register with CCR and ORCA, and that contracting professionals check SAM 
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to ensure that no adverse records are on file that would prohibit the award of a federal 
contract prior to issuance. Additionally, contracting professionals are required to utilize 
FAPIIS prior to contract award (Ginman, 2011). FAPIIS was implemented in 2010 as a 
tool for contracting officers to assist in responsibility determinations. The system is a 
compliment to the EPLS and compiles records regarding criminal convictions, active 
legal action, and contract performance records. The two publicly accessible systems must 
be checked to ensure a clear record prior to analyzing proposals submitted and again prior 
to the award of a contract (Ginman, 2011).  
The WAWF system was instituted to automate the invoice and billing process. In 
the past, the process of invoicing and billing through submission and routing of paper 
documents resulted in lost paper trails, administrative errors, and ultimately payment 
delays that cost the government significant funds in interest charges (Tourinsky & Haber, 
2007). Receiving reports and invoices were processed individually according to the order 
in which they were submitted. The automated WAWF system ensured that all of the 
necessary documents were electronically uploaded in one place, eliminating redundancy 
and increasing the chances that prompt payments could be achieved. It was reported that 
the  
primarily paper-based receipt and acceptance process was resulting in 
lengthy invoice turnaround times, growing interest burdens, and hefty 
processing fees. In fiscal year 2001 alone, the Navy spent more than $30 
million in interest payments and well over that in vendor payment 
processing fees…. The WAWF initiative was built on a foundation of full 
utilization of source data input—shared electronic documents, data, and 
information. The Navy’s specific impetus to implement WAWF was 
targeted at three main objectives: To eliminate paper from the acquisition 
process, enabling users to access and track documents and processes 
electronically, thereby increasing both efficiency and accountability; to 
save money by lowering interest penalties through faster payment to 
contractors and lowering transaction processing fees by way of electronic 
automation; and to allow the Navy to track supplies, services, and 
government property by integrating Unique Identification (UID), Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), and other technologies. (Tourinsky & 
Haber, 2007, p. 2).  
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The WAWF system also provided the capability to track government property, 
provide global, real-time accessibility and processing of documents, improved data 
accuracy, and secure auditable transactions (Tourinsky & Haber, 2007). 
Coinciding with the acquisition reforms driving the creation of electronic 
catalogues and the increased use of commercial items, was the General Services 
Administration’s (GSA) development of the GSA Advantage website, hosting the GSA 
Schedules (GSA Student Guide, 2014). The GSA Schedules provided pre-negotiated 
commercial contracts with preapproved commercial vendors that afforded discount 
pricing as a benefit of the bulk supplies and services pre-negotiated by GSA. This online 
portal became an easy access vehicle for the acquisition workforce to engage in e-
commerce for expedited purchase of commercial products as well as services (GSA 
Student Guide, 2014). As an offshoot of the initiative to create electronic catalogues, the 
federal government created the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) to publicly 
post synopses, solicitations, and award notices for contract actions over $25,000. The 
creation of the website increased the ability for the acquisition community to ensure 
maximum competition as this venue provided wide dissemination of upcoming business 
opportunities with the federal government.  
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III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The previous chapter provided the reader with information from research 
conducted by the authors to investigate the acquisition reform thesis and the effect of 
those reforms on reporting requirements and workforce improvements undertaken in the 
previous twenty-five year period. Chapter III will build upon the research information 
provided in Chapter II to present the reader with an analysis of these facts in determining 
a path forward for DOD acquisition reform and provide the authors’ conclusion with a 
recommendation for future defense acquisition reform platforms.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION ANALYSIS 
The various DOD acquisition reform initiatives concentrated mainly on initiating 
improvements, implementing structure to facilitate accountability, fostering innovation 
while streamlining the acquisition process and cutting costs, as well as collecting real-
time data for better evaluation of the state of acquisition within the DOD as these reforms 
were implemented. However, in spite of all of the reforms implemented, the discussion 
on how to achieve effective reforms within the system are ongoing in Congressional halls 
and within the acquisition community. Seemingly,  
the current defense acquisition process itself drives significant increases in 
the costs of defense acquisitions. Specifically, one-third of defense 
procurement costs go to overhead. In the past, acquisition reform efforts at 
the DOD have reflexively assumed that an additional layer of review and 
greater centralization will solve whatever shortcomings exist in the 
system. Reformers, whether in the legislative or executive branch, have 
too frequently accepted these increases in overhead because they believe 
that the extra layers of review and centralization will be outweighed by the 
savings brought about by a reduction in the likelihood of mismanagement. 
While this acceptance may be justified when an individual reform is 
examined in isolation, the accumulation of reviews has resulted in the 




1. Primary Research Question:  What acquisition workforce reform initiatives 
have proven successful in reducing cost, schedule, and improving system quality control 
and why? 
Data is lacking to analyze the effect of legacy acquisition reforms on the Defense 
acquisition process that correlate directly to specific acquisition improvements for a 
majority of the acquisition reforms initiated through the preceding twenty-five years. 
DAWIA focused specifically on acquisition workforce reforms, while SARA focused in 
part on acquisition workforce reform as part of a broader acquisition reform initiative. 
Although we can detail whether the reforms were enacted in accordance with the two 
laws, which would be one way of defining success, there is no data that specifically 
supports a positive or negative impact by the reform on reducing cost, schedule, and 
improving system quality control, the intended outcomes of most acquisition reforms. 
The GPRA, FASA, FARA, and SARA all focused on reforms to the acquisition process 
by changing thresholds and increasing oversight and support of defense acquisitions and 
not specifically on the acquisition workforce. While arguments can be made that some of 
these reforms helped to alleviate constraints on the workforce, for example, the FARA 
acquisition threshold increases and focus on commercial products and services, these 
authors were unable to find data to support the impact that it has had on the workforce 
that would prove success in reducing cost, schedule, and improving quality control. This 
could be due in large part, to a lack of acceptability of electronic data calls that have 
become a more integrated part of current business operations in the technological world 
of more recent acquisition reform. It is highly likely that there is a lack of data available 
because it was not the norm to track the reforms using objective data measures. 
Additionally, most reforms are targeted towards large weapons systems, which only 
make up a small portion of the defense acquisition budget (Clark, 2015). This may skew 
any available data or perceptions on acquisition reform as it historically fails to account 
for less complex acquisitions.  
The effects of the three iterations of the Better Buying Power Initiative have been 
assessed through various reports to track the progress made and, according to the 
resultant reports of those assessments, the data shows positive results. Since 2013 and 
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conducted on an annual basis, the USD (AT&L) publishes an extensive research report 
on the “Performance of the Defense Acquisition System.” The report focuses on 
assessing the efficiency with which the department delivers products to the warfighter, 
what changes over time are impacting performance, and what areas within the process are 
still in need of improvements. “By using objective data and analysis to measure 
performance” the reports claim to “identify underlying drivers and inform future 
decisions on programs, policies, and processes” (Kendall, 2013, p. 3).  
The 2014 Performance of the Defense Acquisition Systems Report claims to 
“show…that less cost growth has occurred on major acquisition programs recently than 
in the past” (Hunter, 2014, p. 1). The report credits this success to a combination of the 
Better Buying Power Initiatives and to the 2009 Weapons System Acquisition Reform 
Act because the reforms appear to have  
led to improved decision-making early in the acquisition process, when 
programmatic success or failure is largely determined, by being more 
realistic in projecting costs and evaluating technologies. They also 
reinforced the requirement for competition among contractors and the 
imperative of avoiding gold-plated requirements of the weapons and 
systems they produce. (Hunter, 2014, p. 1).  
While it is a possibility that this assessment is correct, this conclusion cannot be 
made by the authors of this research because of the vast array of reforms that are 
functioning in some fashion alongside the BBP and WSARA.  
The 2015 Performance of the Defense Acquisition System analysis report 
concludes that “cost growth on our major programs is generally at or better than historical 
levels,” however, the report did identify additional areas for improved performance 
(Kendall, 2015b, p. iii). Data from the report indicates that program managers are not 
requiring additional funding for their programs from initial baseline estimates, which the 
report implies is a result of better estimating on the anticipated program costs and of 
contractors for MDAP contracts “doing a better job of meeting cost targets” (Kendall, 
2015b, p. iii). The report suggests this is further evidenced by the “significant increase in 
the number of MDAP contracts started since 2009 with price reductions compared to 
earlier contracts” (Kendall, 2015b, p. iii). The reports imply that these results are 
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“evidence of early success from Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives,” specifically, the 
should-cost initiative. The should cost initiative “requires our managers to actively seek 
ways to save money and to set targets for doing so, not just to stay within their budgets. 
This is a major cultural change that seems to be taking hold” (Kendall, 2015b, p. iii).  The 
authenticity of this data, however, cannot be verified because of the possible effects of 
previous reforms which are still in effect and could possibly influence these findings.  
Because the effects of the BBP cannot be analyzed in isolation, the outcomes of 
these assessments cannot be considered definitive. Since the USD (AT&L) both 
generates the BBP and performs the assessments, there is a possibility that the 
assessments are biased in favor of the initiatives to support the presuppositions of the 
authors of the legislation.  
2. Secondary Research Question:  What measures have been put in place to 
determine success or failure regarding the impact of the reform initiatives on the 
acquisition process? 
Data is lacking to analyze the effect of legacy acquisition reforms on the Defense 
acquisition process that correlate directly to specific acquisition improvements. For 
example, while it is possible to track the number of acquisition workforce that are 
DAWIA level certified in their career field, there is no correlating data that shows a direct 
relation to a positive or negative effect on Defense acquisition. While a multitude of 
Congressional reporting requirements and increased oversight were the tracking 
mechanism of most other acquisition reforms in the preceding twenty-five years, it is 
difficult to ascertain objective data that shows the impact of these reforms on reducing 
cost, schedule, and improving system quality control. For instance, GAO report GAO-13-
103, issued in December of 2012, analyzed the effects of the WSARA; it painted a 
positive picture of the effect the WSARA was having on DOD acquisition reform. 
However, this was only a result of a GAO review of eleven weapon acquisition programs 
and provided anecdotal evidence of success, such as a preliminary independent review of 
the Ground Combat Vehicle forced the Army to reduce the number of requirements for 
the acquisition by 25 percent and prioritized the relative importance of the remaining 
requirements to allow industry to apply creativity to meeting the government’s 
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requirement (Government Accountability Office, 2012). While it certainly shows the 
positive intended consequence from the WSARA implementation, there is little real 
objective data to support the impact of the reform. This makes it difficult to interpret the 
success of acquisition reforms and is a consistent finding when researching the 
effectiveness of acquisition reforms. This may be due to the large number of and varying 
responsibilities to track and evaluate the reforms which may cause a lack of ownership 
over the reform outcomes.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES 
Some experts have asserted and testified before Congress that, throughout the 
history of acquisition reform, the “limited number of available reforms have all been 
recycled. You can centralize or decentralize. You can create a specialist acquisition corps 
or you can outsource their tasks. You can fly before you buy or buy before you fly. 
Another blue-ribbon study, more legislation, and a new slogan will not make it happen” 
(Etherton & Punaro, 2014, p. 4). This point of view is somewhat pessimistic, but it does 
present a few themes that have been recurring in the past few decades of defense 
acquisition reform. These similarities warrant examination to identify the positive and 
negative outcomes of the various reforms that have built upon each other to either obtain 
efficiencies or further encumber the acquisition process.  
The reform initiatives of the past twenty-five years have shown similarities in the 
areas of implementing measures to streamline the acquisition process, increase 
competition, achieve accountability, improve oversight, promote transparency, and 
incentivize contractors to meet the government’s goals of delivering quality products in a 
timely fashion and within budget. Furthermore, these themes consistently overlap among 
the different acquisition reforms implemented throughout the time period being 
researched.  
(i) Competition 
Many of the reforms have focused on increasing competition to lower 
program costs and to leverage innovation from various contractors, 
specifically the latest technology that is available on the commercial 
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market. Reforms such as FASA, FARA, and the proposed Thornberry 
initiatives, all partially focused on opening avenues for greater use of 
commercial items to achieve the goals of acquisition streamlining, 
capitalizing on the market’s cutting edge innovations, reducing program 
costs, increasing competition, and reducing proprietary contractor data. 
Avenues that other reforms have taken to increase competition include 
encouraging the purchase of open architectures and complete technical 
data packages, as was the case with WSARA, or lifting the requirement 
for the cumbersome submission of certified cost and pricing data levied on 
commercial contractors, as was the case with FASA. The various 
iterations of BBP focus on multiple areas to incentivize contractors to 
meet the government goals, including encouraging the acquisition 
workforce to utilize fixed price incentive contracts, build stronger 
relationships with industry through providing draft requirements early in 
the acquisition process, and to better define the best-value sought in 
competition or the technically acceptable requirements in LPTA, as well 
as to reward excellency among suppliers.   
(ii) Oversight and Accountability 
Other reforms such as the GPRA, FASA, SARA, and WSARA instituted 
channels for oversight and accountability through implementing reporting 
requirements, approving officials and approval requirements for various 
technical and budgetary requirements, and certification of cost and pricing 
requirements for the contractor to report. Still other reforms, such as BBP 
and the Thornberry initiatives, propose to decentralize the approval 
authority for those heightened accountability requirements in an effort to 
streamline the acquisition process. Reforms such as DAWIA, GPRA, 
FASA, and WSARA take steps to improve transparency through the 
following: 
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setting standards for across-the-board certification of acquisition 
professionals to ensure the workforce is proficient in their 
competency; 
instituting requirements for producing budgetary and technical 
execution plans;  
reporting performance results; 
enacting requirements for certification of cost and pricing, and 
empowering agencies to audit those reports; and  
requiring the acquisition workforce to meet technology maturity 
milestones and report on those achievements through peer reviews 
and milestone approvals prior to fully committing the government 
to a program.  
(iii) Simplified Acquisition Procedures/Acquisition Streamlining 
Additionally, FASA and FARA raised the SAP threshold, which provided 
greater opportunity to utilize the simplified procedures for expedited 
acquisition. FASA provided for determination of fair and reasonable 
pricing of commercial items on the basis of adequate competition, which 
reduced the burden and time that would be needed to validate and evaluate 
each proposal element to make the required determination. FARA 
provided the ability to set a competitive range to effectively limit 
competition to an amount conducive to conducting an effective 
competition. The BBP initiatives attempted to achieve efficiencies in 
shortening the acquisition timeline by “eliminating unproductive processes 
and bureaucracy,” specifically by “reduc[ing] the frequency of [high level] 
reviews” and pushing the decision authority back down into the hands of 
the PEOs and PMs (Kendall, 2015a).  
(iv) Increasing Product Quality 
FASA targeted product quality through encouraging the purchase of 
commercial items where possible, specifically for the DOD to take 
advantage of the cutting edge technology available on the commercial 
markets. SARA attempted to improve product quality in the acquisition 
 66 
process through instituting performance based contracting where the 
intended outcome of the requirement is documented and the contractor, as 
experts in their field, is provided the flexibility to offer the best solution. 
SARA also worked to improve quality in acquisition by setting aside a 
special training fund to raise the skill level of Contracting Officers. 
WSARA focused on improving quality by putting into place measures to 
promote strong requirements development. The act attempted to improve 
quality through the following measures: 
• instituting the requirement to conduct the AoA for objective 
consideration of the requirement;  
• ensuring maturity of the requirement through various milestone 
approvals prior to committing to the program;  
• mandating consideration and documented planning of 
sustainment phases of the program in the requirement 
development stage;  
• employing prototype development wherever possible; and  
• encouraging open architectures for greater ease of integration.  
The BBP initiatives also focused on strengthening the workforce and 
increasing their skill level as a means to improving the quality of the 
products or services procured. BBP also promoted special benefits to 
outstanding industry performers to ensure quality contractors were 
incentivized to continue high quality standards for future procurements.  
(v) Cost Control 
GPRA instituted a requirement to develop and maintain program plans to 
track program performance through set performance parameters and 
submit annual reports for review on program status in accomplishing the 
cost control measures at that present point in the program. Both FASA and 
FARA implemented similar cost control measures through raising the SAP 
threshold to relieve commercial vendors from the burdensome and costly 
cost-and-pricing requirements previously levied upon them. Additionally, 
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FASA set commercial items and NDI as the preferred method of acquiring 
goods wherever feasible, to cut down on the development costs. FARA 
removed the requirement for commercial vendors to comply with the CAS 
to further unburden commercial industry partners and eliminate additional 
costs associated with the requirement. WSARA focused on improving cost 
control by putting into place measures to ensure solid requirements 
development and requirements to consider sustainment of the product in 
the developmental stages as a means to avoid excessive modifications in 
the advanced stages of the acquisition process. WSARA also worked to 
control costs by encouraging open architectures and the purchase of 
complete technical data packages with the intent to maximize competition 
in the future and eliminate the contractor controlled proprietary data. 
Additionally, WSARA cemented requirements for cost analysis early in 
the design process and appointed the Director of CAPE to report directly 
to the Secretary of Defense to provide independent assessments on cost 
analysis and the planning and programming phases of the PPB&E system. 
The BBP initiatives attempted to achieve cost controls by assigning the 
proper type of contract to disincentivize cost creep and reward thrift and 
efficiencies on the part of the contractor through aligning earned profit/
fees to value to the taxpayer. The BBP also sought to eliminate 
redundancy within warfighting portfolios through identifying where 
multiple programs were pursuing similar objectives and combining those 
efforts into one as a cost saving initiative. 
As detailed above, several of the provisions in these reforms address more than 
one theme in the measures that are implemented. For example, the  DAWIA requirement 
to train the acquisition workforce impacts various themes of acquisition reform by 
ensuring that the workforce is abreast of the latest regulations and all of the tools 
available to them to accomplish the goals of the reforms. The SARA requirement to 
institute performance based contracting has impacts to product quality, cost control, and 
oversight and accountability. The FARA and FASA requirements to prefer commercial 
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items, raise SAP thresholds, and remove certification of cost and pricing and CAS 
requirements all have impacts to competition, cost control and streamlining the 
acquisition process. WSARA initiatives to institute the AoA and milestone approvals 
impact oversight and accountability, cost control, and streamlining the acquisition 
process through the following measures: 
• ensuring system maturity by prototyping where applicable, 
• mandating consideration of system sustainment at requirements development, 
and  
• the utilization of open architectures and complete data packages.  
Of BBP’s many initiatives, the elimination of redundancy among programs 
impacts cost control and streamlining the acquisition process. The majority of the reforms 
have in some way attempted to streamline the process while, at the same time, enforcing 
the acquisition’s accountability in terms of ensuring solid, executable requirements and 
budgetary reporting and tracking. The targets of each of the reforms are aimed to attain 
high product quality, decrease costs over the life of the program, and reduce the overall 
timeline for the acquisition. 
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The preceding part of this chapter provided the reader with an analysis conducted 
by the authors of the impacts of existing acquisition reforms as a basis of determining a 
path forward for DOD acquisition reform. This conclusion will build upon the analysis of 
facts to present the reader with the conclusions of the authors and recommendations for 
the future of DOD acquisition reform. 
By consistently requiring reporting data throughout the various reforms, the DOD 
and Congress have attempted to obtain meaningful and measurable data points in an 
effort to determine the success or failure of the reforms. However, because reform 
initiatives take considerable time following implementation to show results, the full 
measure of the effects of the many acquisition reforms is impossible to ascertain. The 
analysis and results of one reform are not fully documented before another reform is 
instituted. With so many overlapping reforms, conducting an assessment of a single 
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reform cannot provide pure and conclusive data because it cannot be analyzed in 
isolation. The effects of previously implemented reforms have the potential to taint any 
data obtained in the assessment of the reform initiative being reviewed. Additionally, the 
consistency of the way the data is reported is critical to accurate analysis. Over the past 
twenty-five years, data collection methods have evolved with the implementation of 
technology and by the direction of some of the reforms. Multiple data collection methods 
also have the potential to taint the integrity of the data and render the data incomparable. 
In this case, analysis of the data would be skewed as a result of inconsonant data.  
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of a reform, reforms need to be evaluated in 
isolation without the influence of preceding reforms. In order to achieve this goal, 
additional reforms to the system would need to be suspended long enough for the system 
to stabilize. Ideally, this suspension would be for the period of the full acquisition cycle 
of a major weapon system. This length of a suspension would ensure that stabilization 
occurs across the acquisition spectrum, from simplified acquisition programs with 
condensed timelines to major weapons systems that typically span more than a decade 
before reaching completion. One estimate of the life cycle of a major weapon systems 
program, used in a volume of the Defense Research Journal, is approximately fifteen 
years from inception of such a program to its conclusion (Jones, White, Ryan, & Ritschel, 
2014). The authors of this research paper recommend a suspension of all reforms to the 
system for a minimum period of fifteen years before implementing further reform to the 
acquisition process. Once stabilization has been achieved and a new reform is enacted, 
the authors recommend a second suspension of the same timeframe to collect data in a 
uniform manner and analyze the impacts of the reform in isolation. This strategy would 
ensure that the data collected solely represent the effects of the latest reform. This 
recommendation is based upon a political environment that would support such a long-
term approach to acquisition reform, which based upon our research and the frequency of 
acquisition reforms, may be unlikely.  
In closing, without accurate and relevant data on previous acquisition reforms 
given the incremental implementation of acquisition reform initiatives over the past 
twenty-five years, it is impossible to determine the success of such reform initiatives. The 
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recommendation of the authors would be for the legislators and Defense officials to 
suspend acquisition reforms for a period of approximately fifteen years in order to collect 
data on the previous reforms before instituting another reform. Following that suspension 
and the implementation of a new reform, further reforms should be suspended for a 
similar period of time to collect data on the results of that reform. Evaluating the reforms 
as implemented without influencing the system with further reforms is the only way to 
acquire pure data pertaining solely to that reform to assess its successes or failures. By 
using accurate and relevant data to determine the effectiveness of the proposed reform in 
isolation, it should assist in better targeting areas that require further reforms and identify 
areas where reform has not been successful.  
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